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WHAT'S IN YOUR PORTFOLIO?
U.S. INVESTORS ARE UNKNOWINGLY FINANCING




In 2004, a television newscaster asked, "Did it ever occur to you
that when President Bush [said], 'Money is the lifeblood of terrorist
operations,' he [was] talking about your money-and every other
American's money?"' With over 78 million Americans holding an in-
creasingly global2 array of securities though pension plans and mutual
funds, the chances are good that you have money invested in compa-
nies that are doing business in nations that support terrorism. 3 Fur-
* Associate Professor and Co-Director, Business and Transactional Law Center, Washburn
University School of Law. I would like to thank Marc Miller, Phil Halpern, and Cheryl Nichols
for their encouragement and input; Brad Borden for his helpful advice; and Sheila Reynolds for
the opportunity to complete the database. I am also grateful to Sarah Brancatella and Carl
Petterson for their research help. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, David A. West-
brook, for his patience and insight. Any mistakes in the Article are my responsibility.
1. Rebecca Leung, Doing Business with the Enemy: Are U.S. Firms Doing Business in Nations
That Support Terrorism?, CBSNEws, Aug. 29, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/22/
60minutes/main595214.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (emphasis added). In fact, in the run up
to the 2008 U.S. presidential election, USA Today reported that both John McCain and Barack
Obama held family investments in mutual funds with shares in companies doing business in Iran.
See Matt Kelley & Ken Dilanian, Candidates Tied to Iran-Tainted Investments, USA TODAY,
June 3, 2008, at 4A.
2. Aaron Lorenzo, U.S. Investors Increased Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Securities by 20 Per-
cent Last Year, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1426 (Sept. 15, 2008). For a discussion of how to
regulate in a time of widespread global ownership of securities, see generally Ethiopis Tafara &
Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International
Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 31 (2007).
3. As one expert expresses it, "[Tihe principal source of financial and economic support for
Iran and certain other countries of concern are [publicly traded companies]. Most Americans
hold at least some of these companies in their retirement accounts and other investment portfo-
lios." Foreign Policy Implications of U.S. Efforts to Address the International Financial Crisis:
TARP, TALF and the G-20 Plan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation
and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 55 (2009) [hereinafter Foreign Policy
Hearing] (statement of Roger Robinson, Jr., President and CEO, Conflict Securities Advisory
Group). The U.S. Department of State uses the following definition of terrorism: "[T]he term
'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncomba-
tant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents," usually intended to influence an audi-
ence. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006).
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thermore, because of the way U.S. securities regulation currently
operates, you may not be able to find out if you do.
This Article explores why, in an ostensibly public securities market,
investors cannot find out whether their own money goes to countries
that have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as State
Sponsors of Terrorism (SSTs). 4 It also examines the way in which im-
position of U.S. economic sanctions on SSTs should influence the
mandatory disclosure regime for securities that are offered to the pub-
lic in the United States.
This issue is timely. In the wake of the financial crisis, the United
States is attempting to reform its financial regulatory system. At the
same time, in the post-September 11th world, with ongoing wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and renewed concerns about nuclear prolifera-
tion in Iran and elsewhere, the United States is reexamining the ways
in which it responds to security threats. This Article will show that
financial and foreign policy must be coordinated5 in order to create a
sensible and safe regime to govern both securities and security.6
The very existence of this issue may be somewhat surprising. One
might assume that if the United States has designated a country as an
4. "Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act." U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.govl
s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). Such countries are then subject to restrictions on, for
example, "U.S. foreign assistance including Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees (under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)." GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & BAR-
BARA OEGG, POLICY BRIEF 01-11: USING SANCTIONS TO FIGHT TERRORISM (Nov. 2001), http://
www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchlD=79 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Currently the
Department of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism
(SSTs). See U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, supra. North Korea was removed
from the list in the fall of 2008, although it remains subject to a number of other U.S. sanctions.
See Gary G. Yerkey, North Korea's Removal from Terrorism List Seen Having Only Marginal
Impact on Exports, 25 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1517 (Oct. 23, 2008).
5. For example, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the Term Asset Backed Se-
curities Law Facility (TALF) involved enormous outlays of tax dollars with little vetting of recip-
ients regarding their business activities overseas. See Foreign Policy Hearing, supra note 3, at 53
(statement of Roger Robinson, Jr., President and CEO, Conflict Securities Advisory Group).
6. U.S. securities regulation has long played a role in foreign affairs. See Felice Batlan, The
Imperial SEC?-Foreign Policy and the Internationalization of the Securities Markets,
1934-1990 (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/imp/index.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2010) ("The international role of the SEC, however, extends far beyond the securi-
ties markets, whether domestic or foreign. The SEC participated in shaping U.S. foreign affairs
and foreign economic policy."). But see Letter from Diana L. Preston, Managing Dir. & Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, and David G. Strongin, Managing Dir., Sec. Indus.
& Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-27-07/s72707-21.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (arguing that the SEC's mission is not
related to foreign policy and national security matters).
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SST and has imposed sanctions, then it has isolated that country be-
cause U.S. companies may not conduct business in the embargoed na-
tion, and U.S. investors may not invest in companies that conduct
business there.
The legal situation is more complex. U.S. sanctions may not apply
to non-U.S. companies that sell securities in the United States or to
non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Although U.S. companies
cannot do business in most countries subject to U.S. sanctions, if a
foreign country opts not to impose sanctions, then its companies may
lawfully conduct business there. This creates an opportunity for regu-
latory arbitrage. For example, a U.S. company may raise money in
the U.S. capital markets and incorporate a subsidiary in a country that
does not impose any sanctions that prohibit doing business in an SST.
Or, a foreign company may do business in an SST and at the same
time raise capital in the United States. As a result, the objectives of
the U.S. sanctions regime-to isolate the SST-are somewhat
frustrated.
The core mechanism of the federal securities laws-namely, disclo-
sure-can be used to address this tension between national security
policy and global business that is conducted in multiple jurisdictions.
While the United States may not be able to prevent a foreign entity
from doing business in an SST, it can require that entity to disclose
such business if it seeks to raise capital in the U.S. public markets.
The general legal issue, then, is whether issuers with operations in
or with SSTs must disclose those operations in the filings that they are
required to make available to the U.S. investing public. Unsurpris-
ingly, such issuers have resisted disclosing their business activities in
SSTs unless the issuers are obviously required to do so because those
activities are financially very significant.
As discussed in detail below, under U.S. securities laws, whether
business activities must be disclosed generally depends on whether the
information is "material." The materiality of information is analyzed
by asking whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would find the information significant. 7 This Article argues
that business in or with an SST is material and must therefore be
disclosed.
As an empirical matter, disclosure of operations in or with SSTs is
inadequate. This Article analyzes the publicly available disclosure of
over a hundred companies reported to be doing business in the three




SSTs that are subject to the most comprehensive U.S. economic sanc-
tions: Cuba,8 Iran,9 and Sudan' ° (the "Sanctioned Countries")." Less
than half of these companies make any disclosure of their activities in
or with the Sanctioned Countries in the periodic reports they file with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 12 Even in cases
in which companies disclose the existence of operations in or with the
Sanctioned Countries, information about the nature or extent of such
business is often withheld. Moreover, investors looking for informa-
tion about companies' activities in the Sanctioned Countries often
cannot find that information, even if it is nominally disclosed. 13 In
short, disclosure of business in or with the Sanctioned Countries is
ineffective.
The lack of disclosure and the difficulty of finding the information
that is disclosed mean that U.S. investors may unwittingly be support-
ing activities contrary to the security policy of the United States, activ-
ities that would be illegal for a U.S. person to undertake. To the
extent that disclosure is inadequate, the conduct of such companies is
not disciplined by public scrutiny. Fortunately, this problem may be
easily addressed. This Article demonstrates the need for, and then
concludes with suggestions for, a stronger approach to making infor-
mation about capital flows to SSTs more available, thereby fostering
more sound investments and perhaps more responsible business.
8. Cuba was listed as an SST in 1982, "primarily because of its support for the M-19 guerrilla
organization in Colombia." HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. Cuba remains on the list
"because it continues to provide [a] safe haven to individual terrorists and maintains ties to Latin
American insurgents." Id.
9. The State Department listed Iran as an SST in 1984 "in response to [its] alleged ... in-
volvement in the bombing of the U.S. marine base in Lebanon." Id. at 3.
10. Sudan was listed as an SST in 1993 for harboring terrorists and for its unwillingness to
cooperate with international counterterrorism efforts. See id. at 4.
11. In order to study the problem of securities being sold to U.S. investors without disclosing
the issuer's operations in countries designated as SSTs and sanctioned by the United States, this
Article will focus on the three SSTs subject to the most stringent U.S. sanctions and in which
foreign investment is likely: Iran, Sudan, and Cuba. This Article will not include a discussion of
Syria, which has not historically offered significant business opportunities to outside companies.
But see Jay Solomon, Syria Cracks Open Its Frail Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009, at Al; Jay
Solomon, Syria to Open Its Economy to Foreign Investors, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at All.
12. See infra Part V (discussing those findings, which were collected using the SEC's Elec-
tronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval system (EDGAR)).
13. The current limitations of the SEC's web-based search engine, EDGAR, make finding
companies' disclosure of such activities difficult. For example, full text searches of a company's
disclosure are only available for documents that are less than four years old. For a more detailed
discussion of the limitations of EDGAR for these purposes, see infra Part V.A.2.b.
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B. The Halliburton Story
The story of Halliburton Company provides an introduction to the
confusion between existing securities law and the stated objectives of
U.S. security policy. Founded in 1919, Halliburton 14 is one of the
world's largest providers of products and services to the energy indus-
try.15 Halliburton derives over half of its revenue from operations
outside the United States, 16 and it owns or controls a large number of
U.S. and non-U.S. subsidiaries.17
In 2002 and 2003, one of Halliburton's non-U.S. subsidiaries, Halli-
burton Products and Services, Ltd. (HPSL), earned all of its approxi-
mately $30 million to $40 million in annual revenues from oilfield
service work in Iran."' At that time, Iran was already the subject of
comprehensive U.S. sanctions. 19 Consequently, U.S.-incorporated
companies could not-and in fact, still cannot-do business in Iran.
Nevertheless, by using HPSL, Halliburton was able to do indirectly
what it could not do directly because HPSL is incorporated in the Cay-
man Islands and headquartered in Dubai, United Arab Emirates
(neither of which imposes sanctions on Iran). Halliburton's Iranian
activities may have worked against the intent of the U.S. sanctions,
14. The ticker symbol for Halliburton on the New York Stock Exchange is HAL.
15. See Halliburton Co., Corporate Profile-Halliburton-Corporate Profile, http://
www.halliburton.com/AboutUs/default.aspx?navid=966&pageid=2458 (last visited Feb. 10,
2010). Halliburton has over 50,000 employees in approximately 70 countries. Id.
16. See Halliburton Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 44 (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.sec.
gov(Archives/edgardata45012000004501209000098/ed10k2008_final.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2010). In 2008, Halliburton's operations in countries other than the United States accounted for
approximately 57% of its consolidated revenue, and those operations were 56% and 55% of
Halliburton's consolidated revenue during 2007 and 2006, respectively. Id.
17. Despite, or perhaps because of, the uncertain economic climate in the last few years, Hal-
liburton's pace of acquisition of non-U.S. entities has remained brisk. See, e.g., Press Release,
Halliburton Co., Halliburton Acquires PSL Energy Services Limited (July 31, 2007), http://
www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press-release/2007/corpnws 073107.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2010); Press Release, Halliburton Co., Halliburton Enters into Agreement to Ac-
quire 000 Burservice (July 20, 2007), http://www.halliburton.compublic/news/pubsdata/
press-release/2007/corpnws_- 072007.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); Press Release, Halliburton
Co., Halliburton Opens Manufacturing Center in Mexico (Mar. 19, 2007), http://
www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press-release/2007/esgnws_031907.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
18. Letter from Margaret E. Carriere, Senior Vice President & Corporate Sec'y, Halliburton
Co., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (May 26, 2006), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501206000242/filenamel.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2010); see also Press Release, Halliburton Co., Halliburton Business in Iran-Global Over-
view, (Jan. 25, 2004), http://theyesmen.org/agribusinesslhalliburton/news/archive/2004/re-
port.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Halliburton activities in Iran were also conducted, on a
smaller scale, through GVA Consultants AB, a Swedish corporation, and M.W. Kellogg Ltd., a
U.K. corporation. See Press Release, Halliburton Co., supra.
19. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2009). For a description of these sanctions, see infra Part II.B.1.
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but they were not necessarily illegal because the U.S. measures apply
to U.S. companies but not their non-U.S. subsidiaries.20
. Moreover, because HPSL's revenues represented only about 0.5%
of Halliburton's revenue, 21 Halliburton took the position that the Iran
business was not material and did not need to be disclosed to inves-
tors. Halliburton's disclosure documents filed with the SEC for 2002
provided no information about HPSL's activities in Iran and no dis-
cussion of any risk that those activities might pose to Halliburton's
share value or reputation other than a brief reference to potential "re-
strictions on our ability to provide products and services to Iran, Iraq
and Libya, all of which are significant producers of oil and gas."'22
Halliburton's disclosure for 2003 discussed HPSL and activities in Iran
only in the context of informing investors that Halliburton had re-
ceived a letter from the Department of the Treasury's Office of For-
eign Assets Control (OFAC) requesting information about the
company's compliance with U.S. sanctions on Iran.23
Regardless of whether Halliburton's business in Iran was in compli-
ance with U.S. sanctions on Iran, some of Halliburton's investors
would have considered the company's business activities in Iran as im-
portant to their investment decision. On November 12, 2002, William
Thompson, Comptroller of the City of New York and investment ad-
viser and trustee of the New York City Police and Fire Department
Pension Funds (the "NYC Funds"), which together held nearly
318,000 shares of Halliburton, began to pressure Halliburton to dis-
close details about its Iranian business by submitting a shareholder
proposal to have the company establish a committee of its Board of
Directors to review the risks of its operations in Iran.24 Halliburton
20. But see infra Part II.B.1 (discussing facilitation and approval).
21. Press Release, Halliburton Co., supra note 18.
22. Halliburton Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 43 (Mar. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501203000018/edl0k_2002.txt (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). The
reference was found in a "Legal" subsection of the "Forward Looking Information" section as
an example of a type of risk and uncertainty that might cause actual results to differ from Halli-
burton's forward-looking statements and potentially adversely affect its financial condition and
results of operations. See id.
23. See Halliburton Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 54 (Mar. 8, 2004), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501204000086/edlOk2003.txt (last visited Feb. 10,
2010). In connection with that disclosure, the 2003 Form 10-K also mentioned that Halliburton
had received a similar inquiry in mid-2001 and that the company had responded that it believed
it was in full compliance with U.S. sanctions regulations. See id.
24. See Letter from William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the
City of N.Y., to Ms. Susan Steward Keith, Vice President & Sec'y, Halliburton Co. (Nov. 12,
2002), in Halliburton Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 1561298, at *4 (Mar. 14, 2003) [here-
inafter SEC No-Action Letter]. Halliburton resisted the NYC Funds' request. Halliburton
wrote to the SEC to request permission to omit the proposal from the proxy materials. See
1156 [Vol. 59:1151
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eventually released a brief report summarizing its activities in Iran.25
Partially fueled by then-Vice President Dick Cheney's connection
with the company, several negative articles and news programs about
Halliburton's Iranian activities added to the pressure. 26
In 2005, in the face of investor pressure, negative publicity, and gov-
ernment inquiries into Halliburton's compliance with U.S. sanctions
programs,27 Halliburton announced that HPSL would wrap up its ex-
isting business in Iran and launch no new business there. Neverthe-
less, Halliburton firmly maintained that, given the small percentage of
Halliburton revenue represented by the Iranian activities and its deci-
sion not to accept any new contracts,
[w]e do not believe our remaining contracts with Iran constitute a
material investment risk for our shareholders. We are not aware
that any person or entity has made the decision to invest or not to
invest in Halliburton based on activity in Iran, nor do we think it
likely that they would do so. 28
Letter from Bruce A. Metzinger, Senior Counsel & Assistant Sec'y, Halliburton Co., to the Div.
of Corp. Fin., SEC (Jan. 16, 2003), in SEC No-Action Letter, supra, at *1. Halliburton argued
that the operations in Iran were not "material," using the test for proxy materials: stockholder
proposals may be excluded from proxy materials if they concern operations that "account for
less than 5 percent of a company's total assets" and account "for less than 5 percent of its net
earnings and gross sales" for the most recent fiscal year. Id. at 1-3. In a response letter also
submitted to the SEC, the NYC Funds argued that even though the significance was not appar-
ent from an economic standpoint, the business in Iran was significant to Halliburton's business.
See Letter from Janice Silberstein, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the City of
N.Y., to the Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 2 (Feb. 7, 2003), in SEC No-Action Letter, supra, at *6
(citing SEC Rel. No. 12999, Dec. 3, 1976). The NYC Funds also noted that the matter was "of
special interest to the public" because of Vice President Dick Cheney's involvement-he was
CEO of Halliburton until his election in 2000. Id. at 3-4. The SEC declined to let Halliburton
omit the shareholder proposal. See SEC No-Action Letter, supra, at *1. Eventually, Halliburton
worked out an agreement whereby it provided the NYC Funds with a memorandum that re-
ported on Halliburton's business in Iran. See Press Release, Halliburton Co., supra note 18.
25. See Press Release, Halliburton Co., supra note 18.
26. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Dancing with the Devil, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A33
(criticizing the White House for calling the Dixie Chicks "unpatriotic" while allowing Hallibur-
ton to profit from its Iranian operations); Leung, supra note 1.
27. See Halliburton Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 23, at 54; Halliburton Co.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (July 27, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
45012/000004501207000187edjune2007lOqfinal.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Note that Hal-
liburton was simultaneously defending charges that it violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act because of the activities of its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root in Nigeria. See Press
Release, Halliburton Co., Halliburton Announces Settlement of Department of Justice and Se-
curities and Exchange Commission Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press-release/2009/corpnws.021109.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2010). Those investigations ended with Halliburton paying over $380 million in
criminal fines to the U.S. Department of Justice and an additional $177 million in disgorgement
to the SEC. Id.
28. Letter from Margaret E. Carriere, Senior Vice President & Corp. Sec'y, Halliburton Co.,
to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC, supra note 18, at 2 (responding to a
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In March 2007, Halliburton opened a second corporate headquar-
ters in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and it moved its CEO to that
office.29 In April 2007, Halliburton announced that all of its contrac-
tual commitments in Iran had been completed, and that it no longer
was doing business there. Again, Halliburton maintained that its Ira-
nian activities had not been in violation of U.S. laws and regulations. 30
Despite shareholder objections and negative publicity about
HPSL's Iranian activities, Halliburton's quarterly disclosure (Form
10-Q) and annual disclosure (Form 10-K) never included more poten-
tially negative information about Iran than a brief mention of the
OFAC inquiry and the inclusion of Iran in a long list of countries in
which Halliburton operates and in which significant amounts of politi-
cal risk exist. In fact, some of the disclosure about the OFAC inquiry
included information about a study that Halliburton undertook in
2002 and 2003, which had found that Halliburton's Iranian activities
complied with all U.S. laws.31
The Halliburton story is unusual because it was known to the public
and resulted in Halliburton's eventual decision to discontinue opera-
tions in the Sanctioned Country. Review of company disclosure pat-
terns demonstrates that many companies conclude, like Halliburton
did, that their lawful activities in SSTs that are subject to U.S. sanc-
tions are not material under U.S. securities regulations and therefore
do not need to be disclosed to U.S. investors.
This Article looks first at how the United States sanctions SSTs and
then at the disclosures that the United States requires of public com-
May 15, 2006 letter from Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC, to David J.
Lesar, President and CEO, Halliburton Co., that inquired about Halliburton and HPSL opera-
tions in Iran).
29. See Press Release, Halliburton Co., Halliburton Opens Corporate Headquarters in the
United Arab Emirates (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/
press-release/2007/corpnws_031107.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). In 2007, Halliburton moved
its Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer Dave Lesar to Dubai to lead the com-
pany's efforts to increase its business in the Eastern Hemisphere. See id. "The opening of a
headquarters in Dubai is the next step in a strategic plan announced in 2006 to focus on ex-
panding Halliburton's customer relations with national oil companies while concentrating more
of the company's investments and resources in growing its business in the Eastern Hemisphere."
Id. The Dubai headquarters was in addition to the one in Texas. See id. Halliburton moved its
corporate headquarters from Dallas to Houston in 2003. See Press Release, Halliburton Co.,
Halliburton to Consolidate Houston Operations (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.halliburton.com/pub-
liclnews/pubsdatalpress-release/2009/corpnws040309.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
30. See Halliburton Co., Quarterly Filing (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Oct. 26, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501207000309/edsept200710q-fmal.htm (last vis-
ited Feb, 10, 2010).
31. See id. ("Separate from the OFAC inquiry, we completed a study in 2003 of our activities
in Iran during 2002 and 2003 and concluded that these activities were in compliance with applica-
ble sanction regulations.").
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panies that do business in the sanctioned SSTs. Part II walks through
the extensive measures that the United States has put in place in order
to isolate and restrict capital flows to the Sanctioned Countries. 32 Part
III looks at U.S. securities regulation and the standards-particularly
materiality-that govern disclosure of operations in or with the Sanc-
tioned Countries.33 Part IV reviews efforts by investors, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), the SEC, and private data services to
promote disclosure about companies' activities in or with the Sanc-
tioned Countries, and it then explores the objections that have been
raised to proposed disclosure requirements.3 4 Part IV concludes that
the attention of issuers and others demonstrates that operations in or
with the Sanctioned Countries are material within the meaning of the
securities laws. Part V presents the empirical results of a study that
reviewed companies' disclosure of activities in or with the Sanctioned
Countries and demonstrates that disclosure is inadequate.35 Part VI
draws conclusions from the disclosure patterns and makes some rec-
ommendations for change.3 6
II. U.S. SANCTIONS PROGRAMS
A. Background, Uses, and Authority
Economic sanctions are "the deliberate, government-inspired with-
drawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial rela-
tions."'3 7 Sanctions are an old weapon,3 historically connected with
warfare, 39 that are designed to isolate another country. In 1919, Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson famously stated,
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender.
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will
be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life
32. See infra notes 37-178 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 179-249 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 250-332 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 333-380 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 381-389 and accompanying text.
37. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. ScHorr, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & BARBARA
OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCFIONS RECONSIDERED 3 (3d ed. 2007).
38. Their first recorded use was in 432 BCE, when Pericles adopted the Megarian Decree. See
id. at 9-10; THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 139-40 (Rex Warner trans,,
Penguin Books 1954) (mentioning the Megarian Decree as a trigger of the first part of the Pelo-
ponnesian War); see also ARISTOPHANES, ACHARNIANS 520-43 (Jeffrey Henderson ed. & trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (assigning the Megarian Decree more direct responsibility for starting
the war).
39. Most well known in U.S. history, perhaps, was the North's blockade of the Confederate
States during the Civil War, as the result of which the South lost crucial access to foreign im-
ports. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 37, at 40.
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outside the nation boycotted but it brings pressure upon the nation
which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.4 0
Since World War I, countries have imposed economic sanctions more
than 187 times to achieve their goals.4 1 By imposing economic sanc-
tions, instead of or in addition to military force, a country is trying to
change the behavior of another country's government.42 Sanctions
are an instrument of foreign policy,43 "part and parcel of international
diplomacy. 44
Sanctions remain controversial. While sanctions may avoid blood-
shed for the sanctioning country, sanctions impact the target country
like a siege: the greatest suffering is inflicted on society's weakest ele-
ments. 45 Business interests tend to oppose sanctions, citing their ad-
verse impact on competitiveness. 46 In addition, sanctions may fail.47
Many policymakers doubt their effectiveness,48 and since the onset of
the financial crisis, some analysts have argued that sanctions stand in
40. Id. at 1 n.1 (citing WILSON'S IDEALS 108 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1942)). The increase in the
use of economic sanctions was also connected to the establishment of the League of Nations.
41. For a list, see id. at 20-38 (presenting Table 1A-1 for the period 1914-2000 and Table 1A-2
for the period 2000-2006).
42. See Raj Bhala, MRS. WATU and International Trade Sanctions, 33 INT'L LAw. 1, 2 (1999).
43. See id. at 1.
44. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 37, at 5.
45. For a demonstration of this effect, see Richard Garfield, Morbidity and Mortality Among
Iraqi Children from 1990 Through 1998: Assessing the Impact of the Gulf War and Economic
Sanctions (Mar. 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gar0l/
index.html (showing that mortality among children under five doubled during the 1990s, ac-
counting for "a minimum of 100,000 and a more likely estimate of 227,000 excess deaths among
young children from August 1991 through March 1998," most of which were associated with
sanctions (emphasis added)). See also GEOFF SIMONS, IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCrIONS: LEGAL
REMEDY OR GENOCIDAL TOOL? 124-40 (1999) (detailing the U.S. imposition of sanctions on
Cuba and categorizing them as "genocide").
46. See, e.g., USA Engage, Background and History, http://www.usaengage.org (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
47. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 37, at 7-9.
48. See, e.g., Posting of Simon Cox, Economics Correspondent, The Economist, to Council on
Foreign Relations, Online Debate, Are Economic Sanctions Good Foreign Policy? (July 27,
2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication//13853/are-economic-sanctions-good-foreign-policy.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (noting that "by the time sanctions are imposed, they have probably
already failed"). For a more positive explanation, see R. Richard Newcomb, Former Dir. of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Canada and U.S. Approaches to Trade Sanctions-U.S.
Speaker, Address at the Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference on
Understanding Each Other Across the Largest Undefended Border in History (Apr. 15, 2005),
in 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 43, 44 (2005) ("1 certainly hope it safely can be said that we demonstrated
that sanctions can be an effective tool of U.S. foreign policy and national security."). Mr. New-
comb served as the director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from January 1987
until October 2004.
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the way of restoring U.S. economic prosperity. 49 After all, Hallibur-
ton moved its CEO and half of its headquarters to Dubai.50
U.S. economic sanctions are often particularly controversial for sev-
eral reasons. First, the United States sanctions frequently. 51 It has
been estimated that approximately two-thirds of the world's popula-
tion has been subject to U.S. economic sanctions at some point.52 Sec-
ond, U.S. sanctions often affect third parties that are neither in the
United States nor the target country.5 3 Applied extraterritorially, 54
U.S. sanctions regimes may conflict with international legal principles
regarding a nation's authority to legislate,55 and they have triggered
negative responses by other countries.56 For example, U.S. trading
49. See, e.g., Bryan Early, Op-Ed, To Lift the US Economy, Lift Sanctions on America's Foes,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 25, 2009, at 9 ("American sanctions cost American jobs. With a
new administration and a major economic crisis before us, there is a unique opportunity for
policymakers to overcome the entrenched interests that support the sanctions against countries
such as Iran and Cuba and do something positive for the American economy.").
50. See Press Release, Halliburton Co., supra note 29.
51. For a conflicting view, see Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic? U.S. Business' Curious
Crusade, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 2, 4 ("The allegation of a sanctions epidemic is de-
monstrably false-a myth spread with the intention of misleading Congress, the American Pub-
lic, and the American business community.").
52. See Bhala, supra note 42, at 4. Sanctions have been popular with both Republican and
Democratic administrations and are one of the principal tools of U.S. foreign policy. See New-
comb, supra note 48, at 45.
53. The U.S. trend toward increased extraterritorial use of sanctions can be discerned in many
developments. For example, the Cuban Democracy Act, enacted in 1992, included a provision
that prohibited U.S.-owned or -controlled firms in foreign countries from engaging in certain
types of transactions in Cuba. See 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a) (2006). For a more general discussion of
this and similar provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act, see Comm. on Inter-Am. Affairs, The
Legality of the Extra-Territorial Reach of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 51 REC. Ass'N B.
CITY N.Y. 322, 327 (1996).
54. This is not only true in the context of economic sanctions. Consider, for example, Judge
Learned Hand's famous ALCOA decision in 1945 regarding the use of the Sherman Act to bring
charges against foreign aluminum traders who affected the price of aluminum in the United
States. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
55. Generally, a state's legislation with regard to conduct satisfies these criteria only (1) if the
conduct takes place "wholly or in substantial part ... within its territory," (2) if the conduct is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory, or (3) if the conduct is directed against the
security of the state or a limited class of other states interests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(a); see also id. §§ 401(1)(c), 403(3). Even when one of the bases
for legislative jurisdiction is present, international law would not permit a state to legislate "with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state [if] the exercise of such
[legislative] jurisdiction [would be] unreasonable." Id. § 403(1). When it would not be unrea-
sonable for each of two states to legislate with respect to a particular matter and the legislation
of the two states conflicts, a state should, under international law, defer to the other state if the
interest of the other state is clearly greater. See id. § 403(3).
56. Negative responses have not been limited to other countries. A variety of U.S. and inter-
national private sector groups have sharply criticized U.S. imposition of extraterritorial sanc-
tions. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, Advisory Panel Set to Urge State Department to Oppose
Extraterritorial Sanctions by U.S., 25 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 830 (June 5, 2008); see also HARRY
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partners have objected in multilateral venues57 and enacted "blocking
statutes" 58 that prohibit their companies from complying with U.S.
sanctions. 59 The U.S. sanctions programs against Iran, Sudan, and
Cuba analyzed in this Article all have significant impacts on non-U.S.
entities. Third, U.S. sanctions are often imposed unilaterally.60 That
is, the United States may impose measures limiting the activities of
U.S. companies in SSTs. Other states, however, may choose not to
impose such restrictions on companies that are incorporated under
their law. The resulting gap created the space for the Halliburton con-
flict, and this gap is getting bigger.61
The United States' frequent, extraterritorial, and unilateral use of
sanctions means that companies with activities in multiple jurisdic-
tions may be subject to different and conflicting regulations. These
conflicts create not only difficulties for those companies but also op-
portunities to capitalize on the gaps, a form of regulatory arbitrage.62
Companies that have operations in terrorism-sponsoring countries
that are subject to U.S. sanctions, and that also offer securities in the
United States without even disclosing those operations, capitalize on
the differences among regulatory regimes.
L. CLARK & LISA W. WANG, DEWEY BALLANTINE LLP, FOREIGN SANCTIONS COUNTERMEA-
SURES AND OTHER RESPONSES TO U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL SANCTIONS (2007), available at
http://www.usaengage.org/storage/usaengage/Publications/2007 foreigncountermeasuress-
tudy.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
57. For example, the European Union took the United States to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body over the extraterritorial measures put into place by the
United States in 1996. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
58. For a full survey and analysis of such measures, see CLARK & WANG, supra note 56, at
8-12.
59. The United States also has such a "blocking" statute: the anti-boycott law that grew out of
U.S. opposition to the Arab League's boycott of Israel. The U.S. law was part of the 1977
Amendments to the Export Administration Act. See 15 C.F.R. § 760.2 (2009).
60. For an insightful analysis of persistent unilateralism in the world trading system, see gener-
ally Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 15 BERKE-
LEY J. INT'L L. 159 (1997). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (finding that U.S. unilateral sanctions against Nicaragua were unjustified).
61. A recent study found that new unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States are on
the rise. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, STUDY OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS 1997-2006
(2006), available at http://www.usaengage.org/storage/usaengage/Publications/2006-study-of_
new_%20usunilateral_%20sanctions.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
62. For example, approximately 50 German firms have branch offices in Iran, and nearly
12,000 German companies do business there. Mehr News Agency, 12,000 German Companies
Doing Business in Iran, PAYVAND IRAN NEWS, May 5, 2009, http://www.payvand.com/news/09/
may/1055.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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Most U.S. sanctions63 are imposed through executive action by
OFAC,64 a part of the Department of the Treasury. 65 In some cases,
Congress, states, and even local municipalities 66 impose measures as
well. Currently, OFAC imposes restrictions67 with respect to thirteen
63. This Article focuses on formal U.S. sanctions programs, but it is important to bear in mind
that much of U.S. action is more informal. For example, in the mid- and late 2000s, U.S. Trea-
sury officials met with dozens of banks worldwide to discuss the financial and reputational risk of
doing business with Iran. See Isolating Proliferators and Sponsors of Terror: The Use of Sanc-
tions and the International Financial System to Change Regime Behavior: J. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the
Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade & Technology of the H. Comm.
on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 29-30 (2007) (joint statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assis-
tant Sec'y for Terrorist Fin. & Fin. Crimes, and Adam J. Szubin, Dir. of OFAC). Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary Glaser and OFAC Director Szubin referred to the voluntary implementation of
U.S. sanctions by non-U.S. international financial institutions as a decisive "force multiplier."
Id. at 28. Economic sanctions are also occasionally imposed by the United Nations. U.S. imposi-
tion of sanctions in such a multilateral context, however, does not create the "gap" or the disclo-
sure problem that is the focus of this Article.
64. OFAC is a part of the Office of Terrorism and Foreign Intelligence. See U.S. Treasury,
Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/index.shtml
(last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
65. Typically, the President will issue an executive order declaring an international emergency
and directing the Department of the Treasury to promulgate appropriate regulations. Sanctions
put into place before 1977 were based on the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). See 50
U.S.C. § 5(b)(1)(B) (2006) (authorizing the President of the United States "during the time of
war" to prevent or prohibit transactions in any property in which a foreign county or national
has any interest by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States). The embargo
against Cuba is based on TWEA. For more recent sanctions programs, the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the statutory authority. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07
(2006). The sanctions against Iran and the Sudan are primarily based on IEEPA, which was
amended in 2007 by the International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act to in-
crease the civil penalties for violations of orders or regulations issued pursuant to IEEPA. Pub.
L. No. 110-96, 121 Stat. 1011 (amending IEEPA § 206, 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2006)).
66. State and local measures were used most famously against South Africa in the 1980s and
early 1990s. However, some state measures have been successfully challenged. See, e.g., Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (overturning Massachusetts's Burma law);
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (striking down
Illinois's Sudan law).
67. Technically, they are licensing systems with detailed rules about which activities require a
license. See Lillian V. Blageff, Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Embargoes Programs, Including
2006 Update, 16 INT'L HUM. RTs. J. 3 (2007). Thus, some transactions may qualify for a so-called
general license, which means that they may be undertaken without prior OFAC approval. All
others must receive a license from OFAC on a case-by-case (that is, "specific") basis. In the
more extensive sanctions programs, such as the ones for Cuba, Iran, and Sudan, a license may be
required for virtually all activity and be nearly impossible to obtain. See generally Tracy J. Chin,
An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How OFA C's Regulations Restrain First Amendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1883 (2008) (discussing the denial of a license to Iranian author and Nobel Peace Prize
winner, Shirin Ebadi).
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countries, 68 including Cuba, Iran, and Sudan, which are also among
the countries designated as SSTs. 69
B. U.S. Sanctions on Iran7°
1. OFAC Measures
The United States has imposed some kind of economic sanction on
Iran since the Islamic revolution in 1979.71 The current Iranian Trans-
actions Regulations7 2 were put into place pursuant to President Ron-
ald Reagan's 1987 Executive Order 12,613, which imposed an import
embargo on Iranian-origin goods and services in response to Iran's
support for international terrorism and its aggressive actions against
68. These countries include Belarus, 31 C.F.R. pt. 548 (2010), Burma, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (2009),
Ivory Coast, 31 C.F.R. pt. 543 (2009), Cuba, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2009), Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 31 C.F.R. pt. 547 (2009), Iran, 31 C.F.R. pts. 535, 560 (2009), Iraq, 31 C.F.R. pt. 575
(2009), Lebanon, Exec. Order No. 13,441, 3 C.F.R. 232 (2008), North Korea, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500
(2009), Sudan, 31 C.F.R. pts. 538, 546 (2009), Syria, 31 C.F.R. pt. 542 (2009), and Zimbabwe, 31
C.F.R. pt. 541 (2009), as well as the Balkans, 31 C.F.R. pt. 588 (2009), and the Former Liberian
Regime of Charles Taylor, 31 C.F.R. pt. 593 (2009). See U.S. Treasury, Sanctions Programs Sum-
maries, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 29,
2010). OFAC also administers a number of "list-based" programs that identify their targets by
name, based on parameters describing their objectionable activities or attributes; these programs
include Counter Terrorism Sanctions, Diamond Trading Sanctions, Counter Narcotics Traffick-
ing Sanctions, and Non-Proliferation Sanctions. See id.
69. SSTs are countries designated by the Department of State under § 60) of the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979. Such countries are then subject to restrictions on, for example, U.S.
foreign assistance, including Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees under the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961. Historically, the U.S. State Department's list of "State Sponsors of Terror-
ism" could be different from the list of countries designated by the Department of the Treasury,
through OFAC, in the "Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations," which was based
on the countries designated as of the effective date of those regulations. In May 2009, however,
OFAC revised the regulations to reconcile the two lists, with the result that Iraq, Libya, and
North Korea were removed from the OFAC list. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2009).
70. For a full discussion of the chronology and impact of various U.S. sanctions against Iran,
which is beyond the scope of this Article, see HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 37, at 144-46.
71. See Patrick Clawson, Iran, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 85, 85
(Richard N. Haass ed., 1998). The Iranian Assets Control Regulations were promulgated in
1979 in response to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3
C.F.R. 457 (1979); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 535 (2009). Using these regulations, the United States
froze approximately "US $12 billion in Iranian Government bank deposits, gold and other
properties .... including $5.6 billion in deposits and securities held by overseas branches of U.S.
banks." OFAC, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. ECO-
NOMIC SANCTIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF O.F.A.C. REGULATIONS INVOLVING SANCTIONS AGAINST
IRAN 4 (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/
iran.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). The United States later expanded the freeze into a full trade
embargo, which was lifted when the Algiers Accords were signed with Iran in 1981. See id.
Because many U.S. nationals still hold pre-1979 claims against Iran, however, the Iranian Assets
Control Regulations remain in effect. See id.
72. 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2009).
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nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf.73 Between 1995 and
1997, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Orders 12,957, 74
12,959, 75 and 13,059,76 which initially prohibited U.S. involvement
with petroleum development in Iran, and later prohibited virtually all
trade and investment activities with Iran.77
The Iranian Transaction Regulations prohibit the importation of
Iranian goods or services into the United States,78 as well as the ex-
portation of almost all U.S. goods, technology, or services to Iran.79
With the exception of contracts entered into before May 7, 1995, no
investment in Iran is permitted.80  The regulations also prohibit fi-
nancing, trading, or performing services related to Iranian oil or pe-
troleum products that are refined in Iran.81 All transactions with the
broadly defined "Government of Iran" are also prohibited. 2
Thus, the regulations amount to a ban on virtually all U.S. trade and
investment activities with Iran, and they apply to all "U.S. Persons,"
defined as "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity
organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign
branches), or any person in the United States. '8 3 The OFAC Iranian
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1987). Executive Order 12,613 was issued
under the statutory authority of § 505 of the International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1985 (ISDCA), 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (2006).
74. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1995) (prohibiting U.S. involvement with petro-
leum development in Iran).
75. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1995); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (2006); 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (note) (2006) (tightening sanctions against Iran substantially).
76. See Exec. Order No. 13,059, 3 C.F.R. 217 (1997) (clarifying Executive Orders 12,957 and
12,959, and confirming that virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons
are prohibited).
77. Two subsequent changes were made to the regulations. In 2000, the sanctions were eased
by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) in order to allow U.S.
persons to purchase and import carpets and certain food products. See Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114
Stat. 1549A-67 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-11 (2006)). In 2008, sanctions were
tightened when authorization for so-called U-turn transactions that involve Iran was revoked.
See 73 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,541-42 (Nov. 10, 2008) (amending 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.405, 560.516).
78. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.201 (2009).
79. There is an exception for U.S. agricultural exports. In fact, in the summer of 2008, Iran
bought more than one million tons of hard red winter wheat directly from the United States-its
first purchase of U.S. wheat since the 1981-1982 marketing year. Tom Polansek & Louise
Radnofsky, Iran Buys Wheat from U.S. for First Time in 27 Years, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2008, at
A3; see 31 C.F.R. § 560.204.
80. See id. § 560.207.
81. See id. § 560.209.
82. See id. pt. 560. "Government of Iran" is defined in 31 C.F.R. § 560.304 to include any
entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, which is in turn defined in § 560.313. In
December 2008, OFAC further expanded the scope of that definition to include various nonfi-
nancial as well as financial institutions determined to be owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran. See id. pt. 560 app. A (2009).
83. Id. § 560.314.
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regulations do not directly apply to the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies, but they do prohibit any U.S. person from approving, fi-
nancing, facilitating, or guaranteeing a transaction between Iran and a
foreign person (such as a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company) if the
U.S. person is precluded from performing the transaction directly. 84
The scope of the Iranian regulations' application to non-U.S. subsidi-
aries of U.S. companies has been controversial. The activities con-
ducted in Iran by HPSL, discussed above in Part I.B, may be an
example of the uncertain scope of the "approval and facilitation"
language.85
2. Congressional Action
a. The Iran Sanctions Act
Many other countries chose not to join the United States in enact-
ing trade sanctions against Iran in 1995 and 1996.86 In fact, in late
1995, foreign companies began to increase their investment in Iran's
energy sector,87 and those investments produced profits that the uni-
lateral U.S. sanctions denied to U.S. companies. In 1996, the U.S.
Congress passed and President Clinton signed what is now known as
the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). 88
The ISA prohibits any person from making an investment 89 of over
$20 million per year that directly and significantly contributes to the
enhancement of Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or trans-
84. See id. § 560.208 ("[N]o United States person, wherever located, may approve, finance,
facilitate, or guarantee any transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign
person would be prohibited by this part if performed by a United States person or within the
United States.").
85. See Terence J. Lau, Triggering Parent Company Liability Under United States Sanctions
Regimes: The Troubling Implications of Prohibiting Approval and Facilitation, 41 AM. Bus. L.J.
413 (2004).
86. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: IRAN
SANCTIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
87. See id. at 1-2.
88. The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) was originally known as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541. However, on April 23, 2004, President George W.
Bush certified that Libya had fulfilled the requirements of all UN resolutions relating to the
downing of Pan Am Flight 103, and the Act was terminated with respect to Libya. See KATZ-
MAN, supra note 86, at 3. The ISA was renewed in 2001 and again in 2006, and it is currently
scheduled to expire on December 31, 2011.
89. The definition of "investment" in the ISA includes
entry into a contract [on or after August 5, 1996] that includes responsibility for the
development of petroleum resources located in Iran or .... provid[es] for the general
supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of such a contract.... [or]
provid[es] for the participation in royalties, earnings, or profits [from such]
development
[Vol. 59:11511166
20101 WHAT'S IN YOUR PORTFOLIO? 1167
port by pipeline its petroleum and natural gas reserves. The ISA in-
structs the President to impose at least two sanctions from a menu of
seven possible sanctions on any person that the President determines
has made such an investment. The sanctions choices include measures
such as denying the U.S. Export-Import Bank's assistance for the ex-
port of any goods or services to the sanctioned person, and prohibiting
any U.S. financial institution's extension of more than $10 million in
credit during a twelve-month period to any sanctioned person.90
U.S. companies were already prohibited from investing in Iran
when the ISA was passed. Its primary targets were non-U.S. compa-
nies profiting from the exploitation of the significant oil and natural
gas resources in Iran. Such investment is often not prohibited under
the law of those companies' home countries.
However, the ISA has not been enforced by the United States. The
President may waive application of sanctions if he certifies that doing
so is important to the U.S. national interest.91 One such waiver was
granted by President Clinton for the 1997 investment in the South
Pars gas field by French company Total S.A., along with Russia's Gaz-
prom and Malaysia's Petronas. 92
or the purchase on or after August 5, 1996 of an ownership interest in such development. Pub. L.
No. 104-172, § 14(9), 110 Stat 1549-50 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)). It also
includes additions to existing investment. See ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24,
§ 5, 115 Stat. 199, 200 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)). Expressly excluded
from the definition of "investment" are the "entry into, performance, [and] financing of con-
tract[s] to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology." See Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(9), 110
Stat. 1550 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)).
90. The sanctions include (1) denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guaran-
tees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned person; (2) denial of licenses for the U.S. export of mili-
tary or militarily useful technology; (3) denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one
year; (4) if the sanctioned person is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a pri-
mary dealer in U.S. government bonds; (5) if the sanctioned person is a financial institution, a
prohibition against serving as a repository for U.S. government funds; (6) prohibition on U.S.
government procurement from the sanctioned person; and (7) restrictions on imports from the
sanctioned person, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. See
Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1545-46 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)).
91. See Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 9(c), 110 Stat. 1547 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note)
(providing a presidential waiver in the "national interest"). There are also several "exceptions"
that grant the President discretion not to impose sanctions, such as when sanctions would nega-
tively affect the procurement of goods or services that are essential to national security. See id.
92. The waiver was part of the settlement of the European Union's WTO complaint about the
United States' extraterritorial application of both the ISA and the Helms-Burton Act. See
KATZMAN, supra note 86, at 3; infra notes 156-173 and accompanying text. Total S.A. recently
announced that it is seeking to continue its investment in Iran in partnership with the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). See Simon Hall & Jason Dean, Total Aims for Deeper
Ties to Chinese Firm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2009, at B3.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
b. Additional Congressional Measures Against Iran
In the United States, there has been some frustration with the
weakness of the ISA 93 and the unwillingness of successive administra-
tions to enforce it. U.S. companies are strongly prohibited from doing
business in Iran, but many of their foreign competitors and even affili-
ates conduct business in Iran. Companies that have operations in Iran
may not make the operations widely known, and yet they are able to
access the U.S. capital markets freely. In the final years of the Bush
Administration, Congress considered several different pieces of legis-
lation that would have produced better information or restricted ac-
cess to U.S. capital markets by companies doing business in Iran.94
None, however, were enacted.
President Barack Obama initiated a new approach of outreach to
U.S. adversaries. 95 The Obama Administration adopted a "two-
track" policy of engagement with Iran, which was backed by the pros-
pect of new sanctions. The United States made several overtures to
the Iranian regime, and it attempted to broker a deal to ship more
than half of Iran's low-enriched uranium abroad. 96 However, the con-
tested June 2009 election, harsh treatment of democratic protests, and
the discovery of an undisclosed uranium facility in Qom further
strained U.S.-Iranian relations.97
Congress has continued to work to stiffen sanctions on Iran. In Oc-
tober 2009, the House overwhelmingly approved the Iran Sanctions
Enabling Act, 98 which authorizes a state or local government to adopt
93. A U.S. Government Accountability Office report released in December 2007 found ram-
pant circumvention of the U.S ban on trade and investment. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, IRAN SANCTIONS: IMPACT ON FURTHERING U.S. OBJECTIVES IS UNCLEAR AND SHOULD
BE REVIEWED (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0858.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2010); see also Gary G. Yerkey, GAO Says Impact of U.S. Sanctions against Iran "Difficult to
Determine", 25 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 138 (Jan. 24, 2008).
94. Those measures include S. 970, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 3227, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 3445,
110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 957, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by House, July 31, 2007); and H.R.
7112, 110th Cong. (2008) (as passed by House, Sept. 26, 2008); H.R. 2880, 110th Cong. (2007);
and H.R. 2347, 110th Cong. 2007) (as passed by House, July 31, 2007). See KATZMAN, supra
note 86, at 7.
95. See Paul Richter & Peter Nicholas, Time for Talk May Be Over, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2009, at Al.
96. See Tony Karon, Stalemate: How Obama's Iran Outreach Failed, TIME, Dec. 22, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1949265,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
97. See Alan J. Kuperman, Op-Ed., There's Only One Way to Stop Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2009, at A19 (advocating military air strikes against Iran); Gerald F. Seib, U.S. Growing Impa-
tient with Iran, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at A2 (interviewing General James Jones, Nat'l Sec.
Advisor).
98. Iran Sanctions Enabling Act, H.R. 1327, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, Oct. 14, 2009).
The Act was approved by a vote of 414 to 6.
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and enforce measures to prohibit the investment of its assets in Iran's
energy sector, and to divest its assets from or prohibit the investment
of assets it controls in, persons who have investments of more than
$20 million in Iran's energy sector.99 In December 2009, the House
passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act,10° which aims to
restrict gasoline supplies to Iran and strengthen the ISA. On January
28, 2010, the Senate passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Ac-
countability and Divestment Act of 2009,101 which seeks to expand the
ISA, impose new sanctions on entities that are involved in exporting
refined petroleum products to Iran or building Iran's domestic refin-
ing capacity, impose a broad ban on most imports from and exports to
Iran, freeze the assets of Iranians active in weapons proliferation or
terrorism, and enable Americans to divest their assets from energy
firms doing business with the Iranian regime. 10 2
3. State Measures
In addition, approximately a dozen states-including Arizona,10 3
California,10 4 Florida, 10 5 Georgia, 10 6 Illinois,10 7 Indiana, a0 8 Louisi-
ana,10 9 Michigan, 110 Minnesota,"' Missouri,"12 and New Jersey'1 3-re-
99. See Rossella Brevetti, House Approves Frank's Iran Sanctions Bill Allowing State, Local
Governments to Divest, 26 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1444 (Oct. 22, 2009); Congressional Research
Service, Summary H.R. 1327-Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1327&tab=summary (last visited Jan.10, 2010).
100. Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009, H.R. 2194, 111th Cong. (2009) (as passed
by House, Dec. 15, 2009).
101. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009, S. 2799,
111th Cong. (2009).
102. See Press Release, Banking Committee Approves Dodd-Shelby Iran Sanctions Bill (Oct.
29, 2009), http://dodd.senate.gov/?q=node/5303 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); Washington Watch, S.
2799, The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, http://
www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/111-SN-2799.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-393 (2009).
104. California Public Divestment from Iran Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7513.7 (West 2009).
105. FLA. STAT. § 215.473 (2009). It also bars companies from doing business in Sudan.
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 47-20-83.1 (Supp. 2009).
107. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.15 (2009).
108. IND. CODE § 5-10.2-10 (2009).
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:313 (2009).
110. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 38.1133d (Supp. 2009).
111. MINN. STAT. § 11A.244 (2009). The new law requires the investment board to scrutinize
its holdings for companies actively doing business in Iran and to notify the businesses that they
are subject to divestment. After a ninety-day period, the law requires the board to start getting
rid of its stock in those companies. The law does not apply to humanitarian groups or companies
authorized to do business in Iran by the federal government.
112. Mo. REV. STAT. § 30.953 (2009).
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.12 (West 2009). New Jersey had prohibited its state pension
fund from making investments in companies doing business in Sudan in 2005. See Laura Craven,
Jersey Won't Invest in Companies Doing Business with Iran, NEWJERSEY.COM, Jan. 4, 2008, http://
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quire their state investment boards, pension funds, or both to divest
their assets from companies that do business in Iran. Many other
states have more limited measures in place or under review. 114 The
adoption of these Iranian divestment measures indicates that informa-
tion about companies' business in and with Iran is material; these
large, influential institutional investors cannot make an informed in-
vestment decision without such information. Furthermore, restric-
tions on and risks associated with investment in Iran may increase due
to Iran's continued refusal to abandon its plans to acquire nuclear
weapons. Investors' need to know about business in Iran is likely to
increase.
C. U.S. Sanctions on Sudan
1. OFAC Measures
The United States has maintained sanctions against Sudan for over
a decade. 115 Citing the Government of Sudan's (the "GOS") contin-
ued support for international terrorism, its efforts to destabilize neigh-
boring governments, and its widespread human rights violations,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,067 in 1997.116 The Or-
der resulted in OFAC's promulgation of the Sudanese Sanctions Reg-
ulations (the "SSRs") on July 1, 1998. The SSRs prohibit U.S.
companies without a license from engaging in commercial transactions
with the GOS. 117 In addition, the SSRs block any property or inter-
ests in property of the GOS that are in the United States or within the
possession or control of U.S. companies. 118 The SSRs were expanded
by President Bush in 2006,119 and they now block all property of per-
sons determined to be contributing to the conflict in Darfur 120 and
www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/01/ersey-wont-invest in-companie.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2010).
114. For example, in 2009, the Pennsylvania Tobacco Settlement Investment Board (TSIB)
adopted a resolution that prohibits Tobacco Settlement Investment Fund monies from being
invested in foreign companies tied to Iran and Sudan. See H.R. 1821, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess.
(Referred to Finance Committee on Dec. 14, 2009); Press Release, Josh Shapiro, Pa. State Rep.,
Shapiro Leads Tobacco Settlement Fund to Invest Terror Free (Feb. 24, 2009), http:/
www.pahouse.com/PR/153022609.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
115. See OFAC, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO SUDAN 1 (2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
programs/sudan/sudan-report -030509.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
116. Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,989 (Nov. 3, 2007).
117. See OFAC, supra note 115, at 11.
118. See 31 C.F.R. § 538.201 (2009); OFAC, supra note 115, at 4.
119. See Exec. Order No. 13,400, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,483 (Apr. 26, 2006); Exec. Order No. 13,412,
71 Fed. Reg. 61,369 (Oct. 13, 2006).
120. These provisions implement the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which
calls for support of the Government of Southern Sudan and assistance with the peace efforts in
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impose a broad trade embargo on Sudan. In addition, the 2006
changes excluded the regional Government of Southern Sudan (the
"GOSS") and several other areas of Sudan (the "Specified Areas")
from the definition of the GOS, thereby removing them from the
scope of the blocking authority under the U.S. regulations.121 The
regulations also now prohibit all U.S. companies from engaging in
transactions "relating to petroleum or petro-chemical industries in Su-
dan, including but not limited to oil, oilfield services, and oil or gas
pipelines." 122
The SSRs, like the Iranian regulations, largely do not apply to non-
U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. companies, although they do have some
"anti-facilitation" language. The SSRs apply to "U.S. Persons," again
defined as "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity
organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person
in the United States."1 23 The SSRs "prohibit the facilitation by a U.S.
person of the direct or indirect exportation or reexportation of goods,
technology or services to or from non-Specified Areas of Sudan."'1 24
The SSRs do not prohibit facilitation of a trade or financial transac-
tion that the U.S. person could engage in directly.125 Further, the
SSRs allow U.S. persons to perform "services of a purely clerical...
nature, such as reporting on the results of a subsidiary's trade, that
[do] not further trade or financial transactions with Sudan or the
[GOS]. '' 1 2 6
In May 2009, in furtherance of the purposes of the executive orders
issued by President George W. Bush in 2006 and as a complement to
the SSRs, OFAC promulgated a separate set of Darfur Sanctions Reg-
Darfur, and which provides certain economic assistance. See Pub. L. No. 109-344, 120 Stat. 1869
(current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)).
121. See OFAC, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S.
SANcrIONs: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUDANESE SANCTIONS REGULATIONS-TITLE 31 PART 538
OF THE U.S. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDER-BLOCKING PROPERTY
OF PERSONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN'S DARFUR REGION 1 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/sudan/sudan.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
122. OFAC. supra note 115, at 2; see also OFAC, supra note 121, at 2.
123. 31 C.F.R. § 538.315 (2009). "U.S. person" is also defined in section 3(c) of Executive
Order 13,400 and section 6(c) of Executive Order 13,412. See Exec. Order No. 13,400, 71 Fed.
Reg. 25,483, 25,484 (Apr. 26, 2006); Exec. Order No. 13,412, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,369, 61,370 (Oct. 13,
2006).
124. OFAC, supra note 121, at 2; see 31 C.F.R. § 538.206 (2009).




ulations (the "DSRs"). 127 The DSRs are targeted sanctions that are
directed at certain actors in connection with the conflict in Darfur.
2. Congressional Action
Congress has acted numerous times in response to the conflict in
Sudan.128 In 2002, Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act,'129 which
directed the President to work toward a solution in Sudan. 30 In 2004,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, which
strengthened the Sudan Peace Act in response to events in Darfur.13 '
In 2006, Congress passed the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act,' 32
which imposed sanctions against individuals who were responsible for
the genocide in Darfur, and included other measures that were de-
signed to support the protection of civilians, humanitarian operations,
and peace efforts in Darfur.
Congress acted directly again with the Sudan Accountability and
Divestment Act of 2007 (SADA). 133 SADA authorizes state and local
governments to divest public assets from companies that are involved
in certain business sectors in Sudan. It also provides a safe harbor for
mutual funds and pension plans choosing to divest their assets from
such companies. 134 Finally, it prohibits the U.S. federal government
from entering into new contracts with these offending companies.
In April 2008, the SEC implemented regulations governing disclo-
sure of divestment by registered investment companies in accordance
with SADA. These regulations require investment funds that seek the
protection of the safe harbor to disclose their divestment from securi-
ties and issuers that the investment funds determine either do direct
business in Sudan or have investments in companies that do business
in Sudan. 35 Thus, the SEC enables investment funds to divest from
127. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 546 (2009).
128. This is in addition to the changes that resulted from the TSREEA, Pub. L. No. 106-387,
114 Stat. 1549A-67.
129. Pub. L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2006)).
130. See id. §§ 2(16)(A), 6(b)(2).
131. Pub. L. No. 108-497, 118 Stat. 4012 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
132. Pub. L. No. 109-344, 120 Stat. 1869 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
133. Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
134. See Pub. L. No. 110-174, § 4, 121 Stat. 2519 (amending § 13 of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13).
135. See Disclosure of Divestment by Registered Investment Companies in Accordance with
Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,328 (Apr. 30, 2008). The
regulations amended Form N-CSR, which is used by registered management investment compa-
nies filing certified shareholder reports (17 C.F.R. §§ 249.331, 274.128 (2009)) and Form N-SAR,
which is used by registered investment companies to file periodic reports with the SEC (17
C.F.R. §8 249.330, 274.101 (2009)); see also SEC Issues Rule Requiring Funds Seeking Immunity
to Report Divestitures from Sudan, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 708 (May 5, 2008).
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companies that are doing business in an SST, but it still does not ad-
vance a mechanism that enables these funds to discover such business
to begin with.
3. State Measures Relating to Sudan
Some of the most well-publicized information about companies' ac-
tivities in or with Sudan has come out because a number of states have
revised guidelines for their pension funds, procurement agencies, and
treasuries in order to prohibit investment in companies that do busi-
ness in or with Sudan. The Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terror-
ism in the Sudan (the "Illinois Sudan Act") 136 prohibited the Illinois
Treasury from depositing state funds into any financial institution that
had not certified that it had implemented policies to ensure that loan
applicants do not directly or indirectly do business in Sudan,137 and it
restricted the investment of public pension funds in Sudan-connected
entities.138 In February 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois struck down the Illinois Sudan Act, stating that it
interfered with the federal government's authority over foreign af-
fairs.' 39 To some extent, SADA was passed in response to this rul-
ing.140 Nevertheless, a number of states and institutional investors
maintain terror-free or Sudan-free investment disclosure or prohibi-
tion provisions.1 41
D. U.S. Sanctions on Cuba
1. OFAC Measures
The third Sanctioned Country considered in this Article is Cuba.
U.S. sanctions against Cuba are some of the oldest and most restric-
tive of existing U.S. sanctions regimes.1 42 The Cuban Assets Control
136. See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.5-22.6 (2009); id. 5/1-110.5.
137. See 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6(b)(1)-(5):
138. See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.5 (2009).
139. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. I1. 2007).
140. This was much like the situation when U.S. sanctions against Burma (Myanmar) were
meaningfully strengthened after the Supreme Court struck down the Massachusetts law that
restricted investment in Burma. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
141. For example, the California Public Employees' Retirement Systems (CaIPERS) is re-
quired to submit to the California legislature a report on investment holdings in companies with
business operations in Sudan. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7513.6 (West 2008). Another example is
the state of Louisiana. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:313 (2009).
142. Only the measures in place against North Korea are older. Although North Korea was
recently removed from the SST list, the majority of measures remain in place against it. See
Yerkey, supra note 5, at 1517. This of course draws into question the efficacy and economic
impact of such long-running sanctions. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
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Regulations (the "CACRs") were issued 143 in 1963, and they prohibit
virtually all trade and transactions with Cuban nationals or the Cuban
government without an OFAC license. The goal of the sanctions is "to
isolate the Cuban government economically and deprive it of U.S.
dollars. 1
44
In addition, the CACRs impose a total freeze on Cuban assets in
the United States, both government and private; all property of Cuba
and Cuban nationals that is within the possession or control of persons
subject to the regulations is blocked. 145 The CACRs differ from the
sanctions against Iran and Sudan because they clearly apply to non-
U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. issuers; the CACRs apply to "person[s] sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States,1 4 6 which includes all U.S.
citizens and permanent residents wherever they are located, all people
and organizations physically in the United States, and all branches and
subsidiaries of U.S. organizations throughout the world. 147 The appli-
cation of the CACRs to non-U.S. companies owned or controlled by
U.S. individuals or companies (that is, foreign subsidiaries) means that
U.S. companies cannot conduct operations in or with Cuba indirectly
that they cannot conduct directly.
The CACRs have been revised numerous times.1 48 During Presi-
dent Obama's Administration, for example, the regulations have been
eased with respect to restrictions on trade and travel, 49 and on the
provision of telecommunications services in Cuba.15 0  Nevertheless,
OF U.S. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA xiv-xv (2001); see DONNA RICH KAPLOWITZ,
ANATOMY OF A FAILED EMBARGO: U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA (1998).
143. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations were based on authority that was delegated to
the Department of the Treasury using the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA). See 50
U.S.C. § 5 (2006). TWEA was passed in 1917 in order to grant the President authority during
wartime and national emergency to investigate, regulate, and prohibit transactions. See Blageff,
supra note 67, at 3. After 1977, TWEA was reserved for use during wartime, and subsequent
sanctions programs were promulgated under the authority of IEEPA, among other statutes.
144. OFAC, supra note 121, at 1.
145. 31 C.F.R. § 515.205 (2009).
146. "Person[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" includes U.S. persons as well
as "any corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or do-
ing business, that is owned or controlled by" U.S. citizens or residents, or an organization organ-
ized under U.S. law. Id. § 515.329.
147. See OFAC, supra note 121, at 1.
148. For a good overview of the various changes made to the sanctions over the years, see
Blageff, supra note 67, at 16.
149. See OFAC, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CUBA
TRAVEL AND TRADE-RELATED PROVISIONS OF ThE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2009
(2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcementlofac/programs/cubalomni-guide.
pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
150. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to
the Cuban People (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Fact-Sheet-
Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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the United States' long-term policy of isolating Cuba may be notewor-
thy to investors.
2. Congressional Action
a. The Cuban Democracy Act
Congress has also implemented a number of measures directly. In
1992, partially in response to Cuba's post-Soviet efforts to attract in-
come through foreign tourism,151 Congress passed the Cuban Democ-
racy Act (CDA). 152 The CDA denounced human rights abuses in
Cuba, tightened U.S. restrictions on trade with Cuba, 153 and increased
pressure on other countries that provided assistance to Cuba. 154 The
most controversial provision of the CDA was the seemingly extraterri-
torial prohibition on U.S.-owned or U.S.-controlled foreign firms' en-
gagement in certain types of transactions with Cuba. 155
b. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
(Helms-Burton Act)
The subsequent limited market reforms implemented by the Castro
regime led to an increase in foreign investment, though due to the
OFAC embargo and the CDA, no U.S. or U.S.-controlled companies
can make such investments. A turning point came in 1996-just as the
Clinton Administration was considering relaxing the U.S. embargo-
when the government of Cuba shot down two U.S.-based civilian air-
151. See Robert S. Gelbard, The Cuban Democracy Act and US Policy Toward Cuba, re-
printed in 3 U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch (Aug. 17, 1992) (statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Prin-
cipal Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Inter-Am. Affairs). The U.S. presidential elections that year
also likely played a role.
152. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6000-10 (2006). The CDA was also known as the "Torricelli Act," after its
sponsor, New Jersey Democratic Representative Robert Torricelli.
153. See id. § 6005. The CDA also prohibited vessels that had entered a Cuban port from
loading or unloading in the United States for at least 180 days. See id. § 6005(b).
154. See 22 U.S.C. § 6003. The CDA states,
The President may apply the following sanctions on any country that provides assis-
tance to Cuba:
(A) The government of such country shall not be eligible for assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or assistance or sales under the Arms Export Control
Act ....
(B) Such country shall not be eligible, under any program, for forgiveness or reduc-
tion of debt owed to the United States Government.
Id. § 6003(b)(1) (citation omitted).
155. See 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a). This section effectively prohibited trade between Cuba and for-
eign corporations that are owned by U.S. persons. For a good discussion of the extraterritorial
reach of the CDA, see Comm. on Inter-Am. Affairs, supra note 53, at 327. Of course, the
OFAC regulations had a similar reach, but the direct imposition by Congress of such a measure
attracted attention.
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craft. Soon afterward,1 56 Congress passed and President Clinton re-
luctantly157 signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act, which is popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act.158
Like the Cuban Democracy Act, the Helms-Burton Act was prima-
rily targeted at non-U.S. companies doing business in Cuba.159 Under
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,160 any person, including any U.S.
or foreign person or entity, that traffics 161 in property that was confis-
cated 162 by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959 can be
liable in U.S. courts to any U.S. national who owns the claim to such
property. 63 No claims have been filed under Title III, however, be-
cause its application has been suspended 64 since it went into force. 165
Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act requires the U.S. Secretary of
State to deny a visa to any alien determined to be a person who con-
156. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 was signed into law
on March 12, 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021-91 (2006)).
157. See JOAQUIN Roy, CUBA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE HELMS-BURTON DOCTRINE:
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS 1 (2000).
158. The legislation was sponsored in the Senate by Jesse Helms (R-NC) and in the House by
Dan Burton (R-IN).
159. U.S. companies were already prohibited from that business by the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations.
160. Pub. L. No. 104, 114, §§ 301-06, 110 Stat. 785, 814-22.
161. Under Title III, a person or entity "traffics" in property if, at any time three months or
more after the effective date of Title III, such person
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
merges, uses or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by another person
.. without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the
property.
22 U.S.C. § 6023(13) (2006).
162. For these purposes, confiscated property is generally defined as property nationalized,
expropriated, or otherwise seized by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959, for
which adequate compensation has not been paid, with the exception (for Title III purposes) of
certain residential property. See id. § 6023(4)(A).
163. The amount of liability to which a trafficker may be subject is unconnected to the bene-
fits derived from the trafficking activity; instead, it is based on the value of the claim to the
property. See id. § 6082(a)(1).
164. The Helms-Burton Act provides that the President may suspend the right to bring Title
III actions upon a determination that suspension is necessary to the national interests of the
United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. See id. § 6085(b).
165. The President may suspend Title III for periods of up to six months. See id. Suspen-
sions have been made every six months (in January and July) by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and
Obama. For the most recent suspension, see Letter from President Barack Obama to Sen.
Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Appropriations et al. (July 14, 2009), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.govlpresdocs/20091DCPD-200900567.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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fiscates property, or who traffics 166 in confiscated property, 167 a claim
to which is owned by a U.S. national. 168 Likewise, Title IV requires
the Attorney General to exclude these aliens from the United States.
Title IV cannot be waived by the President, but it requires action by
the U.S. government (normally the Secretary of State) and has been
little enforced. 169
One of the reasons for the consistent suspension of Title III and the
lack of enforcement of Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act has been the
negative reactions of U.S. trade partners to its extraterritorial ef-
fect.1 70 Since no U.S. persons or entities could trade with Cuba under
the existing OFAC embargo, the Helms-Burton Act targeted non-U.S.
persons, and it triggered strong objections from other countries. The
European Union, Mexico, and Canada, none of which prohibit com-
panies from doing business in Cuba, initiated a World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) claim, and they enacted or revised existing "blocking
166. Under Title IV, trafficking is defined slightly differently than under Title III. It occurs
when a person
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers or otherwise disposes of confiscated
property,
(ii) purchases, receives, or obtains control of, or otherwise acquires confiscated prop-
erty, or
(iii) improves•... invests in .... or begins after [the date of enactment of the Helms-
Burton Act] to manage, lease, possess, use or hold an interest in confiscated property,
(iv) enters into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise benefiting from confis-
cated property, or
(v) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by another person
... without the authorization of any United States national who owns a claim to the
property.
22 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(2)(A) (2006).
167. For purposes of Title IV, confiscated property is defined slightly more broadly than for
Title III, as any property nationalized, expropriated, or seized by the Cuban government without
compensation, whether before or after January 1, 1959. See id. § 6091(b)(1).
168. The same sanctions will apply to any alien who is a "corporate officer, principal, or share-
holder with a controlling interest [in] an entity which has been involved in [such] trafficking," as
well as such person's agent, spouse and minor children. Id. § 6091(a)(3)-(4).
169. The only notable exclusions have been of principals of "Sherritt International, a Cana-
dian mining company, Grupo Domos, a Mexican telecommunications firm, and Grupo B.M., an
Israeli citrus company." CLARK & WANG, supra note 56, at 16. Several other companies were
reportedly sent "warning" letters to cease trafficking. See, e.g., Paolo Spadoni, The Impact of the
Helms-Burton Legislation on Foreign Investment in Cuba, 11 CUBA TRANSITION 18, 28-29
(2001), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/volumell/spadoni.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010) (reporting that the U.S. had excluded the executives of three companies and
maintained pressure on others by sending warning letters); Firms Told of Visa Denial Under
U.S.-Cuba Law, CUBANET.ORG, July 10, 1996, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y96/ju96/
lle2.html (quoting White House spokesperson Nicholas Bums' statement that letters had been
sent to a "handful" of firms).
170. For a good introduction to international reactions to the Helms-Burton Act, see Roy,
supra note 157.
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statutes" that prevent their companies from complying with the
Helms-Burton Act.171 The United States eventually reached a com-
promise1 72 with its trading partners: they withdrew their objections
and the U.S. President pledged to suspend the application of the pri-
vate right of action provision (Title III) and not to enforce the exclu-
sion provision (Title IV) against companies incorporated in those
countries.1 73
c. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
In 2000, Congress relaxed trade sanctions on agricultural and medi-
cal exports with the passage of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Ex-
port Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA).174  Some of the
restrictions relating to sale of agricultural products to Cuba were
tightened again in 2004 as a result of a Treasury Department interpre-
tation of "payment of cash in advance. '175 That interpretation was in
turn reversed in 2009, a change expected to increase U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba.
3. State Measures
Some measures have been enacted at the state level to restrict com-
merce with Cuba. For example, in an effort to discourage travel to
Cuba, the Florida Legislature approved the Sellers of Travel Act in
2008, which would have imposed "new fees and performance bond
requirements on travel agencies that sell trips to Cuba '1 76 and other
countries listed by the State Department as SSTs. The Sellers of
171. The blocking statutes also prevent compliance with the ISA.
172. See Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, Statement on U.S.-EU Understanding on
Expropriated Property (May 18, 1998), http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/issues/cuba/docs/
law-politics/Statement%20US-EU%20understanding.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); see also
Roy, supra note 157, at 5.
173. There has been meager enforcement of Title IV with only a handful of companies-
STET, Grupo Domos, BM Group-receiving letters. The Helms-Burton Act also codified the
existing economic embargo of Cuba in § 102(h), which had previously been implemented by
OFAC, so that the President cannot lift it without making a determination according to § 205
that a transition government in Cuba is in power and consulting with Congress in accordance
with § 102(h). Some discretion to modify the embargo was left with the Executive Branch, and
OFAC has continued to issue licenses and implement changes as needed.
174. Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-67 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-11
(2006)).
175. See 69 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (June 16, 2004); 70 Fed. Reg. 9225 (Feb. 25, 2005).
176. Washington Wire, Wall Street Journal, U.S. Weighs in on Florida's Restrictions on Cuba
Travel, http://blogs.wsj.comlwashwire/2009/03/23/9321/tab/print/ (Mar. 23, 2009, 16:44 EST). Af-
fected travel agencies are required to post up to a $250,000 bond and pay up to $2,500 in state
registration fees. Laura Figueroa, Challenge to Florida's Cuba Travel Law Heads to Court,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.rniamiherald.com/new/legislature/v-print/story/
993663.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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Travel Act was characterized as a consumer protection initiative and a
homeland security measure, 177 but it never took effect. 178
All three of the Sanctioned Countries-Iran, Sudan, and Cuba-are
subject to extensive U.S. sanctions. U.S. companies may not do busi-
ness in any of the Sanctioned Countries. Iran and Sudan are U.S. for-
eign policy priorities. Cuba, although not as newsworthy in terms of
terrorism, is the subject of longstanding U.S. sanctions that frequently
conflict with other countries' tolerance, if not encouragement, of busi-
ness there. But what about foreign companies that are permitted by
their home country law to do business in or with the Sanctioned
Countries? Do foreign companies have to disclose those operations in
order to operate in the United States or to access the U.S. capital
markets?
III. THE DEMAND FOR INFORMATION AND SECURITIES LAWS:
WHO DOES BUSINESS WHERE?
A. The Demand for Information
The scope of the U.S. sanctions regimes and the pressure on institu-
tional investors to divest from companies doing business in the Sanc-
tioned Countries has increased the demand for information about the
activities of foreign companies and foreign affiliates of U.S. compa-
nies. Both large institutional investors (for example, CalPERS) and
individuals want to know where the companies they invest in are do-
ing business. 179
For their part, large multinational companies with activities and
shareholders in multiple jurisdictions may resist providing different
177. Representative David Rivera proposed the measure as a homeland security initiative
because it targets Florida-based agencies that sold trips to the countries on the State Depart-
ment's list, stating that "[nlow more than ever Florida must protect our consumers." Laura
Figueroa, Federal Ruling Offers New Hope for Cuba-Trip Travel Agents, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
22, 2009, at B3.
178. After a number of affected travel agencies filed suit, U.S. District Court Judge Alan S.
Gold issued a preliminary injunction that blocked application of the law and later ruled the
measure unconstitutional. See Judge Strikes Down Florida Cuba Law, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.upi.comrrop-News/2009/04/14/Judge-strikes-down-Fla-Cuba-travel-
lawfUPI-81431239743279/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). In connection with that case, the U.S.
Department of Justice objected to the Florida measure as interfering with the federal govern-
ment's "ability to speak for the United States with one voice in foreign affairs." Figueroa, supra
note 176.
179. As Richard Newcomb, Director of OFAC from 1987-2004, expresses it, "Shareholders,
regulators, corporate officers, directors, pension fund managers, politicians, and the public at
large are becoming sensitized and aware more and more of how corporate decisions about who,
where, and how they do business may affect their lives and the lives of others." Newcomb, supra
note 48, at 52.
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types and amounts of information to an international alphabet soup of
regulators. Given the unilateral nature of many U.S. sanctions pro-
grams, some non-U.S. companies may lawfully do business in and with
the Sanctioned Countries while U.S. companies may not. What hap-
pens when the non-U.S. company sells stock in the United States?
Must it disclose any activity in or with a Sanctioned Country?
As discussed below, if the business activities in the Sanctioned
Country are financially substantial in comparison to the size of the
company, then disclosure of operations in the Sanctioned Country is
clearly required. 180 The more difficult question arises when the opera-
tions in the Sanctioned Countries are economically slight in compari-
son with the size of the company. Does the fact that such business
could be prohibited if the company were organized under U.S. law
mean that it must be disclosed? Does an extensive U.S. sanctions re-
gime have a policy implication that makes the information about oper-
ations in or with a Sanctioned Country something that investors
necessarily need or want? 181 To think about that question, it is first
necessary to think about the purpose of U.S. securities laws and the
disclosure that they require.
B. The U.S. System of Securities Regulation Is Based on Disclosure
The U.S. system of securities regulation is based on the assumption
that information is the key to preventing fraud and ensuring sound
investment decisions. The Securities Act of 1933182 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934183 were both passed in the wake of the 1929
stock market crash, which was attributed in part to the large number
of fraudulently floated securities that were sold to the public by un-
scrupulous promoters. 184 The Securities Act of 1933, in fact, became
known as the Truth in Securities Act.185
The emphasis on the disclosure of information in the securities laws
is often traced to the well-known words of Louis Brandeis: "Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman. 1 86 Brandeis' words had a strong influence on Felix
180. See infra Part III.B (discussing Regulation S-K requirements).
181. If so, is it because of the U.S. sanctions, or is it because of the underlying risky situation
that gave rise to the U.S. sanctions? Is there a difference?
182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006).
183. Id. §§ 78a-78nn.
184. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2(3) (6th ed. 2009).
185. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340
(1966).
186. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
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Frankfurter who wrote, as he was working to get the laws passed, 187
"The Securities Act is strong insofar as publicity is potent; it is weak
insofar as publicity is not enough."'18 8 In general, the purpose of dis-
closure is to provide investors with all of the information they need in
order to make informed investment decisions. 189
The U.S. system of federal securities regulation requires that ade-
quate information be provided to investors, but it does not regulate
the particular type or soundness of the investments themselves. 190
Federal securities regulation is disclosure-based, not "merit-based,"191
like some regulations imposed by state "blue sky"'192 securities laws. 193
Over the years, the federal disclosure regime has been strength-
ened.194 In particular, after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Con-
187. Frankfurter was "instrumental in shepherding the Securities Act through Congress."
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Trans-
parency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1221-22 (1999).
188. Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 55. The
debate about disclosure also owes a lot to the writings of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means,
who supported disclosure as a mechanism to promote market efficiency in valuing securities. See
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 317 (1933).
189. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). In the case of public retirement funds that are prohibited from investing in
SSTs, then, that information should be required to be disclosed.
190. The disclosure-based system has of course not been without critics. See, e.g., George J.
Bentson, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); David J. Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities
Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535 (1988). This debate is tied to the merits of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.
191. As enacted, state laws required registered securities to qualify on a merit basis, with
substantive terms that had to be met. See HAZEN, supra note 184, § 1.2[2]. State laws also
generally required issuers to provide investors with full disclosure of relevant facts. See id.
192. Beginning with Kansas in 1911, states had enacted laws to protect their investors from
fraudulent securities. See id. The "blue sky" name is generally traced to an early U.S. Supreme
Court decision noting that state securities laws were intended to avoid "speculative schemes
which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539, 550 (1917).
193. The federal and state systems continue to coexist, but the federal system increasingly
preempts state regulation. The scope of state securities regulation was significantly curtailed in
1996 with the passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA),
which generally preempts state regulation that requires registration or qualification of most pub-
licly traded securities that are listed on a national exchange. See Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102, 110
Stat. 3416 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2006)). For an excellent compara-
tive analysis of preemption, see Cheryl Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption
in the U.S. Securities Regulatory Framework: A Lesson from Canada, Our Neighbor to the North,
10 CHAP. L. REv. 391 (2006).
194. This includes not only major revisions such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act but also smaller-scale adjustments to the system on a constant basis. For
example, the recent financial crisis put a significant amount of pressure on disclosure require-
ments. Regulation S-K, Item 303(a), Instruction 3 requires that the Management's Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A) disclose "known trends
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gress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 95  which dramatically
heightened federal' 96 disclosure and compliance requirements for
public companies.' 97
Companies that sell securities to the public' 98 are required to pro-
vide substantial amounts of information about their operations and
prospects. The companies subject to these disclosure requirements
(so-called reporting companies or public companies) include compa-
nies that have listed securities on a U.S. exchange, 199 companies in-
volved in interstate commerce that have at least 500 shareholders and
$10 million in assets,200 and companies that have engaged in a regis-
tered public offering in the United States.20' The regulations require
disclosure of specified information about the companies in the regis-
tration statement upon the initial issuance of securities, 20 2 periodi-
cally20 3 thereafter, and whenever there is an extraordinary corporate
event.204
[and] uncertainties," which includes forward-looking disclosures that focus on "material events
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported financial information not to
be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial condition." 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303(a)(1) (2009) (instructions to Item 303(a)); see also Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Dis-
closures, Exchange Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 18, 1989). "Significant
changes in the economy or in key sectors of the economy create disclosure challenges for public
companies." Thomas L. Haney, Recent Economic and Financial Markets Developments Should
Spur Fresh Look at Public Companies' Form 10-K and 10-Q Disclosures, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1803 (Nov. 3, 2008).
195. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 7201 note (2006)).
196. See HAZEN, supra note 184, § 1.2(3)(D)(3).
197. See David S. Ruder, Yuji Sun & Areck Sycz, The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2005).
198. For purposes of this Article, a company that sells securities to the public is the same as a
reporting company. This category also includes a number of non-U.S. companies that sell securi-
ties in the United States and that the SEC classifies as "foreign private issuers."
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (2006).
200. See id. § 781(g)(1).
201. See id. § 78o(d).
202. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g, 77j, 77aa (2006). The registration process for issuing securities
to the public includes the production of a prospectus and a registration statement using, for
example, Form S-1 or Form S-3 or, in the case of non-U.S. issuers, Form F-1 or Form F-3 in order
to provide investors with the information they need in order to make an informed decision about
purchasing the securities.
203. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b)(1), 781(g)(1), 78m, 78o(d). This includes filing annual (for exam-
ple, Form 10-K, or in the case of non-U.S. issuers, Form 20-F) and quarterly (Form 10-Q)
reports.
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), (d), (f) (2006). This includes filing Form 8-K reports (or in the
case of a non-U.S. issuer, Form 6-K). The list of events that will trigger such a "current report"
filing was extended substantially by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Disclosure is also required
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The specific information that must be included in the filings has
been defined by the SEC over time. The SEC has made a number of
ex ante decisions about what information is important to investors,
and it promulgated Regulation S-K205 to provide instructions to re-
porting companies. 20 6 Part of the integrated disclosure system,207
Regulation S-K removes much of the issuer's (and its counsel's) dis-
cretion about what to include in filings.20 8
Regulation S-K specifies a number of categories of information that
must be disclosed: information about the company's business, 20 9 the
company's securities,210 the company's financial data,211 the com-
pany's management and certain security holders, 212 and other infor-
mation from the registration statement and prospectus. 213
Importantly, for the purposes of this Article, companies must disclose
the items listed in Regulation S-K whether or not the information is
believed to be important to investors in any particular instance. The
SEC has determined that investors will find the required information
relevant most of the time, and the consistent disclosure obligations
make it possible to compare firms.214
In light of the foregoing, why is there any uncertainty about
whether a public company must disclose its activities in or with the
Sanctioned Countries? As currently drafted, the U.S. federal securi-
ties laws and regulations, including Regulation S-K, do not impose a
specific disclosure requirement that addresses business in or with a
country against which the United States has imposed sanctions, even if
the sanctions have been imposed because the country has been identi-
fied as an SST. Certain general instructions in Regulation S-K sug-
gest, however, that such information must be disclosed.
in connection with proxy statements for annual shareholders meetings with elections. See 15
U.S.C. § 78n (2006).
205. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.702 (2009). For small businesses, the SEC promulgated
Regulation S-B. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-228.702 (2009).
206. The SEC also promulgated Regulation S-X in order to provide instructions about quanti-
tative disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2009).
207. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Ex-
change Act Release No. 18,524, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 3, 1982).
208. See STEPHEN J. CHoI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION; CASES AND ANALY-
sis 45 (2d ed. 2008).
209. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-229.103.
210. See id. §§ 229.201-229.202.
211. See id. §§ 229.301-229.308T.
212. See id. §§ 229.401-229.407.
213. See id. §§ 229.501-229.512.
214. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 208, at 45.
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Specifically, Item 101 (Description of Business) requires a general
description of the business of the company,215 including, "[t]o the ex-
tent material to an understanding of the registrant's business taken as
a whole," 216 information about where a company does business, the
principal markets for the company's products,21" and the sources of
the raw materials used by the company.218 Item 101 also instructs
companies to describe "any risks attendant to [their] foreign
operations, 219
Item 103 of Regulation S-K (Legal Proceedings) requires disclosure
of "any material pending legal proceedings ... to which the registrant
or any of its subsidiaries is a party," including any such proceeding
"known to be contemplated by governmental authorities" and not
routine or incidental to the company's business. 220
Item 303 (Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Con-
dition and Results of Operations) requires a broader discussion of the
company's operations from the management's perspective. Item
303(a) thus requires the company to disclose "currently known trends,
events, and uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have mate-
rial effects" on results of the company's operations or to cause a mate-
rial increase or decrease in the company's liquidity or capital
resources. 221 For example, if substantial numbers of investors ceased
purchasing or divested themselves of the securities of a company be-
cause of its operations in or with a Sanctioned Country, the investors'
actions could have a "foreseeable material impact on the company's
ability to raise cash through the sale of its securities," and the com-
pany would be required to disclose those material effects.222 The in-
structions to Item 303(a) further clarify that "[f]oreign private
registrants also shall disclose briefly any governmental economic, fis-
cal, monetary, or political policies or factors that have materially af-
215. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c).
216. Id. § 229.101(c)(1).
217. See id. § 229.101(c)(1)(i).
218. See id. § 229.101(c)(1)(iii).
219. Id. § 229.101(d)(3).
220. Id. § 229.103.
221. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987).
Regulation S-K, Item 303(a)(1), for example, instructs companies to "[ildentify any known
trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that
are reasonably likely to result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material
way." 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2009).
222. Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to Laura Unger,
Acting Chair, SEC, 1278 PLI/Corp 1125, at *1127 (May 8, 2001) [hereinafter Martin Memoran-
dum]; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Director Martin's analysis in more detail).
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fected or could materially affect, directly or indirectly, their
operations or investments by United States nationals. '223
Finally, a company selling securities to the public in the United
States is required by Item 503(c) to disclose risk factors that may af-
fect the issuer of the securities being offered. Certainly the political
instability in the Sanctioned Countries and the imposition of U.S.
sanctions could be significant enough to require disclosure. 224 In fact,
the term "global security risk" has been coined to describe the risk to
companies from their operations in SSTs.225
Even if information about business in or with a Sanctioned Country
is not required to be disclosed under Regulation S-K, Exchange Act
Rule 12b-20 functions as a catch-all rule, providing that "[i]n addition
to the information expressly required to be included in a statement or
report, there shall be added such further material information, if any,
as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made not misleading. 226
The inclusive anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act, Rule lOb-5
(Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices), also regu-
lates the information that a company must disclose about its activities
in the Sanctioned Countries because it creates liability not only for
making "any untrue statement of material fact" but also for omitting
"a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 227
C. Materiality
The key to these disclosure obligations is whether the information is
"material. ' 228 Unless the information is expressly required without
qualification in Regulation S-K (for example, the year the company
223. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (Instruction 11).
224. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c). Since 2005, "Risk Factors" have been included in quarterly as
well as annual reports. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Release No. 8591, 70 Fed.
Reg. 44,722, 44,786-87 (Aug. 3, 2005).
225. See Foreign Policy Hearing, supra note 3, at 53-54 (statement of Roger Robinson, Jr.,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Conflict Securities Advisory Group).
226. 17 C.F.R. § 12b-20 (2009). Rule 408 of the Securities Act has virtually identical wording
except that it applies to registration statements instead of statements and reports.
227. Id. § 240.10b-5(b).
228. Jeffrey A. Smith, Disclosure of Climate Change Risks and Opportunities, 41 REV. SEC. &
COMMODrTImEs REG., Jan. 2, 2008, at 1, 4. It is important to remember, however, that although
materiality is a key concept with respect to securities law disclosure, not all material information
has to be disclosed. Similarly, with respect to liability, nondisclosure of material information
"will not give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 unless the defendant had an affirmative duty to
disclose that information." Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 285 (3d Cir. 2000).
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was organized2 29 or the existence of transactions worth more than
$120,000 between the company and family members of the direc-
tors230 ), the information must only be disclosed if it is material. As a
practical matter, whether and exactly what a company discloses usu-
ally depends on the company's and its attorneys' materiality
determination.
The Supreme Court provided the definitive definition of materiality
in 1976 in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.2 31 When analyzing a
proxy statement issued in National Industries' proposed acquisition of
TSC Industries, the Court found that information is material if there is
a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure ...would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available. '2 32 Over a decade later, in
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the TSC Industries standard was expressly
adopted in the antifraud context. The Basic Court considered the de-
fendant's public statements denying merger negotiations that were, in
fact, ongoing.233 The Court held that the materiality of information
about future events may be determined by balancing the probability
that the event will occur with the expected magnitude of the event.234
Since the announcement of the materiality test by the Court, there
has been pressure on the SEC to eliminate the uncertainty inherent in
the test and to develop a more objective, bright line rule.235 In 1999,
the SEC provided some clarification of the concept in SEC Staff Ac-
counting Bulletin No. 99 (the "1999 SAB"), which explained, "A mat-
ter is 'material' if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
person would consider it important. 2 36 The 1999 SAB explicitly con-
fronted the issue of whether an objective test for materiality, in the
form of a numerical threshold, was desirable, and it found that such a
test was useful as a preliminary step but not dispositive: "quantifying,
229. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (2009).
230. See id. § 229.404(a).
231. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S; 438 (1976).
232. Id. at 449.
233. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (concerning a Rule lOb-5 claim).
234. See id. at 249-50.
235. The Basic v. Levinson Court specifically considered a Third Circuit test that offered a
bright line rule but rejected it: "[E]ase of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the
purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress's policy decisions." Id. at 236.
236. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151-52 (Aug. 19, 1999)
("Qualitative factors may cause misstatements of quantitatively small amounts to be material.").
Although Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 did not carry the force of law, courts have relied on it
as constituting "a body of experience and informed judgment" and "persuasive guidance."
Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944), and explicitly rejecting the use of numerical benchmarks for assessing
materiality).
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in percentage terms, the magnitude of a misstatement is only the be-
ginning of an analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately be used
as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant considerations. '237
The instructions to Item 101 of Regulation S-K also specify that in
determining materiality for purposes of the description of a business, a
company should take both quantitative and qualitative factors into ac-
count: "Situations may arise when information should be disclosed
about a segment, although the information in quantitative terms may
not appear significant to the registrant's business taken as a whole. '2 38
Obviously, a reasonable investor would want to know about a com-
pany's principal lines of business and the prospects and risks associ-
ated with such business. In arguing that their operations or
investments in the Sanctioned Countries are not material, and there-
fore need not be disclosed, companies have often urged that their bus-
iness in the Sanctioned Countries is a miniscule part of their global
operations. For example, in correspondence with the SEC, General
Electric compared the sales made to customers in Iran with its total
consolidated revenues in 2003, 2004, and 2005, and it found that the
Iranian sales represented only 0.33%, 0.19%, and 0.15% of its total
revenues during each of those respective years. 239 BASF argued that
less than 0.2% of its total.sales in 2004 were to customers in Iran,240
and that sales of dual-use products to Iran represented less than
0.01% of BASF's worldwide consolidated sales in 2004.241
There are obvious concerns with such claims. How credible is the
corporate accounting for business that is not disclosed? How is long-
term damage to a firm's reputation, especially in the case of war or a
terrorist attack, monetized? Why, if the activity is so marginally re-
warding as to be of no importance to the firm's putative business own-
237. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,151.
238. 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (2009) (Instruction 1 to Item 101).
239. Letter from Michael McAlevey, Chief Corp. & Sec. Counsel, Gen. Elec. Co., to Cecilia D
Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 2 (July 14, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed-
garldata40545/0000040554060001371filenamel.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Using a different
yardstick, Baker Hughes, Inc., compared the book value of its assets in Iran and Syria with the
company's total assets as of September 30, 2008, and found them to be less than 0.1%. Letter
from Peter A. Ragauss, Senior Vice President & CFO, Baker Hughes Inc., to H. Roger Schwall,
Assistant Dir., SEC 2-3 (Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/808362/
000095012908005742/filenamel.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
240. Letter from Eckhard Muller, President, Fin. Div., BASF Corp., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief,
Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 3 (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1024148/000110465906024537/filenamel.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
241. BASF Corp., Registration Statement (Form 20-F), at 12 (Mar. 14, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data1024148/000110465907018854/aO7-6595_120f.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010). This disclosure was made after several rounds of correspondence with the Office
of Global Security Risk (OGSR). Six months later, on September 6, 2007, BASF delisted.
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ers, does the firm's management persist in that line of business?
Bracketing such questions, the narrow securities law question is
whether some information that is neither expressly required by Regu-
lation S-K or otherwise nor directly significant to the firm's bottom
line is nonetheless sufficiently material to require disclosure.242
D. Materiality Per Se, Evolving Standards, and the Debate about
Social Disclosure
Some kinds of information about a company must be disclosed re-
gardless of the percentage of overall company revenue that the activ-
ity represents. Some kinds of information will always be material to
investors. As discussed above, much of that information is specified in
Regulation S-K.
But the materiality standard is also adaptable.243 As global markets
and investor priorities evolve over time, the materiality standard en-
sures that information important to investors continues to be dis-
closed. If combating terrorism is a priority for the United States, then
it may be material to potential U.S. investors that the money they pay
for shares in a company may be used to fund operations in a country
that sponsors terrorism. Investors may need information about those
operations in order to make an informed investment decision.
The adaptability of the materiality standard not only applies to the
information being disclosed but also, some argue, to the reason for the
disclosure. As Louis Loss explained in 1969, given the fact that "ap-
propriate publicity tends to deter questionable practices and to ele-
vate standards of business conduct, '244 Congress or the SEC may
expand the disclosure mechanism beyond the principal purpose of in-
forming investor trading in order to address business ethics and corpo-
rate responsibilities. In fact, this expanded use of securities regulation
has already been achieved in some contexts. The securities laws have
incorporated requirements for disclosure of, for example, climate
change risks and opportunities. 245
242. If institutional investors represent a significant percentage of investors and many of them
are prohibited from investing in SSTs, then the SST operations are material operations and
should be disclosed to enable those investors to make informed investment decisions.
243. One investor's flexibility is another's uncertainty, though, and there is often a need for a
clearer standard.
244. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POL-
ICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION FROM THE DISCLOSURE POLICY STUDY (THE WHEAT REPORT) 10
(1969); see also Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 125 (2d ed. 1961).
245. See Smith, supra note 228; see also Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related
to Climate Change, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 33-9106 (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf; Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Interpretive
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The materiality standard could in theory be read to require broad
disclosure requirements, including disclosures that serve public inter-
est purposes. Such so-called social disclosure was analyzed by Cynthia
Williams in her 1999 Harvard Law Review article entitled The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency. 46
Williams defined "social disclosure" to include information about the
countries in which a company does business 247 and argued that, in the
context of proxy solicitations, the SEC has the power to compel ex-
panded social disclosure in the public interest.248 Professor Williams
analyzed the materiality standard and the situations in which a social
issue that is not financially material might be important to investors
who would invest or divest on that basis, creating a financially mate-
rial impact on the company. According to Professor Williams,
"[T]oday's social issue is tomorrow's financial issue.1249
IV. THE SEC, TERROR, AND SHIFTING STANDARDS OF
MATERIALITY
A. The PetroChina Offering
A widely reported example of the conflict between the disclosure
required by the U.S. securities laws and a company's business opera-
tions in a Sanctioned Country was the PetroChina Company Limited
offering. PetroChina was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the China Na-
tional Petroleum Company (CNPC), 250 and it was created for the pur-
pose of attracting foreign capital through an initial public offering
(IPO) in the U.S. markets.251
Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change
(Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
246. Williams, supra note 187.
247. Id. at 1201 n.5.
248. See id. at 1204.
249. Id. at 1284. The academic conversation about using disclosure for policy or public inter-
est purposes continued a few years later when the Harvard Law Review published a note that
argued for a "mandate bounded by considerations of investor welfare and underpinned by the
same economic logic that supports mandatory financial disclosure." Note, Should the SEC Ex-
pand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (2002).
250. CNPC, the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the Chinese National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) are the three largest state-owned oil companies in China. See
Stephen F. Diamond, The PetroChina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in the Anti-Global-
ization Era, 29 J. CORP. L. 39, 46 (2003).
251. See Mark L. Clifford & Dexter Roberts, Can This Giant Fly?: China's Oil Company
Hopes for $5 Billion from Wall Street, Bus. WK., Feb. 7, 2000, at 94B, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/2000/00_04/b3665154.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). PetroChina held
"the 'crown jewels' of the CNPC assets," and it accounted for a "substantial portion of the total
profits" of CNPC. Diamond, supra note 250, at 47. CNPC retained majority control of Pe-
troChina after the U.S. initial public offering (IPO). See id. at 48.
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There was considerable controversy surrounding the PetroChina of-
fering because CNPC held a minority joint venture position in Sudan's
Greater Nile Oil Project, which was accused of human rights abuses.
Various anti-slavery, religious, and conservative national security
groups, as well as the AFL-CIO and several members of Congress, 252
therefore objected to the PetroChina offering.
The question was whether the proceeds from PetroChina's U.S. of-
fering would be used by the parent company (CNPC) to fund opera-
tions in Sudan. 253 CNPC promised to segregate the PetroChina
offering funds and to create separate accounts for the IPO proceeds so
that they would not be used for the Sudanese joint venture. 254 Critics
considered this a restructuring scheme that was designed to avoid U.S.
sanctions on Sudan,255 and they charged that CNPC created Pe-
troChina to access the U.S. capital markets while protecting itself
from negative public reaction to its operations in Sudan.2 56
There was no legal prohibition, however, on offering the Pe-
troChina shares to U.S. investors. OFAC issued an opinion that the
shares could be purchased without violating the U.S. sanctions in
place against Sudan, as long as "there was no 'clear statement' that
CNPC would use the proceeds to retire Sudan-related debt. '257
Groups objecting to the offering had to content themselves with the
fact that CNPC's involvement in Sudan was disclosed at all.
The IPO went forward in April 2000 with minimal disclosure of any
connection between PetroChina and CNPC's Sudan activities258 and
252. Republican Spencer Bachus, Democrat Dennis Kucinich, and Socialist Bernard Sanders
sent a letter to President Clinton that expressed concerns about the use of proceeds from the
offering. See Letter from Congressman Spencer Bachus et al., to President William Jefferson
Clinton (Mar. 31, 2000) (on file with the author).
253. A number of members of Congress expressed their concerns in a letter to President Clin-
ton that, inter alia, PetroChina would use the IPO proceeds to support the CNPC joint venture
in the Sudan. See id.
254. See Diamond, supra note 250, at 67.
255. See Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from
China in 2004-2005, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 243, 272 (2006).
256. See Harvard Univ., Statement by Harvard Corporation Committee on Shareholder Re-
sponsibility (CCSR) Regarding Stock in PetroChina Company Limited, HARV. GAZETTE, Apr. 4,
2005 (on file with the author).
257. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUs FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2000), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/Annual-Report/2000annualreport.pdf (last visited Feb.
10, 2010).
258. In the "Industry Overview" section of the prospectus, PetroChina described the 1999
"restructuring" whereby CNPC incorporated PetroChina and transferred substantially all of its
assets, liabilities, and interests in a number of businesses and operations in China. See Pe-
troChina Co., Final Prospectus 74 (Mar. 27, 2000) (on file with the author). PetroChina specifi-
cally noted that CNPC retained the assets, liabilities, and interests relating to business in Sudan.
See id. at 75.
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the inclusion of a special "Use of Proceeds Verification" subsection in
the "Business" section.25 9 The "Use of Proceeds Verification" subsec-
tion merely disclosed that PetroChina shares were listed in countries
that may impose sanctions on certain other countries, including Su-
dan, where CNPC owned equity interests. The subsection then de-
scribed the segregated accounts into which PetroChina and CNPC
would deposit their proceeds from the offering, and the way in which
funds would be disbursed from the accounts.2 60 The PetroChina U.S.
IPO was somewhat disappointing, 261 raising considerably less capital
than CNPC had originally planned.2 62
The PetroChina offering illustrates the problems with U.S. securi-
ties regulations then and now: the securities laws allowed an offering
that arguably worked against stated U.S. foreign policy goals, and the
offering went forward with inadequate disclosure 263 of the controver-
sial operations of PetroChina's controlling parent.
259. See id. at 119.
260. See id. The Form 20-Fs filed by PetroChina for fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003 made no
mention of Sudan. When the company restructured in 2005, Sudan was mentioned because it
and several other countries were "carved out" of the agreement in order to "give comfort to
investors that their investments would not violate U.S. economic sanctions regulations." Letter
from Li Huaiqi, Sec'y to the Bd. of Dirs., Petro.China Co., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of
Global Sec. Risk, SEC 2 (June 19, 2007) (describing PetroChina's intent regarding its activities in
Sudan and Iran), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1108329/000114554907001074/
filenamel.txt; see PetroChina Co., Annual Report (Form 20-F) exhibit 4.3 (2005), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1108329/000114554905001175/u99842exv4w3.txt (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010). For a good discussion of PetroChina's understanding of what is significant to its
investors and investors' perception of the Sudan activities of PetroChina's parent company
(CNPC), see Letter from Li Huaiqi, Sec'y to the Bd. of Dirs., PetroChina Co., to Ceclia D. Blye,
Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 3 (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1108329/000114554907000265/filenamel.txt (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) ("[Investors under-
stand that [the company] has no control over how dividends that it pays to its shareholders are
ultimately used and will therefore not consider CNPC's activities in Sudan and other countries to
have an impact on PetroChina's business reputation or share value.").
261. See Mark Landler, China's No. 1 Oil Company Goes Public with Whimper, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2000, at C2. In fact, having seen the public reaction to the PetroChina offering, Sinopec
Corporation delayed its planned NYSE IPO by several months. See Karol Nielsen, PetroChina
Begins Trading; Sinopec Postpones, Reduces IPO, CHEMICAL WK., Apr. 19, 2000, at 25, available
at http://www.allbusiness.comlbanking-finance/financial-markets-investing-securities/9284916-
1.html.
262. See Diamond, supra note 250, at 70 (stating that the offering was scaled back "from an
initial goal of raising $10 billion to the final figure of $2.9 billion"). It is unclear whether the Use
of Proceeds Verification mechanism was sufficient to enable investment by U.S. institutional
investors with prohibitions on investment in Sudan. Uncertainty about that issue was probably
not helpful to the offering. PetroChina issued additional shares as an IPO on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange on November 5, 2007, and raised an additional US$8.9 billion. See Elaine Kurtenbach,
After Surge, PetroChina Stumbles in New York, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2007, http://
www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-11-04-1494307240_x.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
263. Arguably, investors did not have the information they needed in order to make informed
investment decisions. In its first annual report in 2000, the U.S. Commission on International
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B. The Unger Letter
On April 2, 2001, Congressman Frank Wolf wrote to Laura S. Un-
ger, Acting Chairman of the SEC, expressing his concerns about the
PetroChina offering and making ten recommendations for enhanced
disclosure by foreign firms seeking access to the U.S. markets.264
Chairman Unger's May 2001 response (the "Unger Letter") 265 out-
lined the SEC's efforts with respect to Sudan and attached a detailed
memorandum about the disclosure standards prepared by David Mar-
tin, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance (the "Mar-
tin Memo"). 266 The Unger Letter stated that the SEC staff "will
attempt to review all registration statements filed by foreign compa-
nies which reflect material business dealings with governments of
countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions administered by OFAC,
or with persons or entities in those countries. '267
Most strikingly, the Unger Letter proposed enhanced disclosure for
foreign registrants doing business in sanctioned countries. 268 Chair-
man Unger pointed out that foreign companies may do business in
Sudan or other countries that are subject to OFAC sanctions, yet still
list on U.S. securities exchanges and offer stock to investors on U.S.
markets. She stated that the SEC does not have the statutory author-
ity to deny such companies access to the U.S. markets on the basis of
their involvement with a particular foreign country, such as Sudan. 269
However, she pointed out that the SEC does have the "statutory au-
Religious Freedom questioned PetroChina's disclosure of the use of the IPO proceeds at the
CNPC level and the potential benefit to the CNPC's operations in the Sudan, and it urged the
SEC to review subsequent disclosures carefully. See U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM, supra note 257, at 3-5. As discussed below, the SEC did write to PetroChina and question
some of its disclosures in 2006 and 2007.
264. See Letter from Congressman Frank Wolf to Laura Unger, Acting Chairman, SEC (Mar.
8, 2001). Congressman Wolf's letter also expressed concern with respect to Talisman Energy,
Inc., a Canadian company with U.S.-listed shares and operations in Sudan. See id. Talisman
subsequently withdrew from Sudan. Congressman Wolf suggested, for example, that foreign
companies seeking access to U.S. markets should disclose their operations in SSTs, as well as
those of their parent companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates. Id. (discussing Recommendation
No. 1).
265. Letter from Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, SEC, to Congressman Frank Wolf, 1278
PLI/Corp 1117, at *1117 (May 8, 2001) [hereinafter Unger Letter].
266. Martin Memorandum, supra note 222.
267. Unger Letter, supra note 265, at 1120-21 (discussing Recommendation No. 2). The Un-
ger Letter also proposed requiring electronic filing by foreign companies. See id. at 1120 (dis-
cussing Recommendation No. 1). The SEC voted unanimously in August 2008 to implement this
proposal. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Modernize Disclosure Requirements to Help
U.S. Investors in Foreign Companies (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
183.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
268. See Unger Letter, supra note 265, at 1121.
269. Id.
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thority to require that U.S. investors receive adequate disclosure
about where the proceeds of their securities investments are going and
how they are being used. '270
In the letter, Chairman Unger used language that closely tracked
the definition of materiality that was articulated in TSC Industries Inc.
v. Northway, Inc. 2 71 and in the 1999 SAB, 2 7 2 stating that "the fact that
a foreign company is doing material business with a country, govern-
ment or entity on OFAC's sanctions list is, in the SEC staff's view,
substantially likely to be significant to a reasonable investor's decision
about whether to invest in that company. ' 273 The implication was that
such business is material per se, 2 7 4 and it must therefore be disclosed.
The Martin Memo expanded on that position and reviewed the ex-
isting disclosure requirements (for example, of business operations,
material risks, and pending litigation). 275
The Martin Memo concluded that "existing SEC disclosure require-
ments might very well warrant disclosure of a foreign company's oper-
ations in, or business relationships with companies from, countries on
... the U.S. State Department's lists of sponsors of terrorism. '276 Di-
rector Martin reiterated that if there is no specific disclosure require-
ment relating to a company's operations in, or its business
relationships with companies from, the countries on the State Depart-
ment's lists, then "the question of whether disclosure [of operations in
SSTs] is required will depend on the materiality of the financial im-
pact of those operations and business relationships on the company's
conduct of its business. '277
270. Id. Chairman Unger reiterated that the federal securities laws are about disclosure and
making sure that investors have "access to material information about the companies and securi-
ties in which they are considering investing." Id.
271. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
272. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999).
273. Unger Letter, supra note 265.
274. See supra Part III.C, D (regarding the standard of materiality). Chairman Unger's exact
meaning was debated because she used the word "material" several times in her letter but did
not explicitly write that such information is material per se.
275. See supra note 222.
276. Martin Memorandum, supra note 222, at 1128.
277. Id. at 1128 (discussing Recommendation No. 1). Director Martin went on to write,
In assessing materiality, the SEC staff takes the view that the reasonable investor gen-
erally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a company's profitability or
financial outlook. Because securities are financial investment vehicles, the materiality
of a foreign company's operations in a particular country and its business relationships
with companies from that country will generally depend on whether these operations or
relationships have had, or are likely to have, a financial impact on the company.
Id. at 1128-29.
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The Martin Memo cited the materiality standard from TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.278 and stated, "We agree that a reasonable
investor would likely consider it significant that a foreign company
raising capital in the U.S. markets has business relationships with
countries, governments or entities with which any U.S. company
would be prohibited from dealing because of U.S. economic
sanctions. '279
Response to the Unger Letter was strong,28 0 most notably from in-
dustry groups such as the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC),
and the position did not survive the term of the next SEC Chairman,
Harvey L. Pitt. In late September 2001, the NFTC President an-
nounced that he had been assured by Chairman Pitt that the SEC had
no plans to require foreign companies with securities listed on U.S.
stock exchanges to make additional disclosures about their business
dealings in countries that were subject to U.S. sanctions.281
278. See id. at 1128 (discussing Recommendation No. 1).
279. Id. at 1129. Martin continued,
The staff will, therefore, seek information from foreign registrants about their material
business in countries on the OFAC's sanctions list and their business relationships with
countries, governments, or entities on those lists. This type of disclosure would make
available to investors additional information about situations in which the proceeds of
an offering could however indirectly benefit countries, governments, or entities that, as
a matter of U.S. foreign policy, are off-limits to U.S. companies.
Id. Director Martin responded to Congressman Wolfs recommendation that foreign companies
disclose steps taken to identify and assess risk from doing business in or with SSTs. He pointed
out that "[w]hen a foreign company initially registers its securities with the SEC, and thereafter
in its annual disclosure on Form 20-F, [it] is required to prominently disclose risk factors that
[might] make an investment in [its securities] speculative or high risk." Id. at 1130; see SEC
Form 20-F, Item 3.D. Such risk factors may include factors that relate to countries subject to
OFAC sanctions where the company has material operations. See Martin Memorandum, supra
note 222, at 1130 (discussing Recommendation No. 2). Director Martin explained,
If it is reasonably likely that U.S. governmental sanctions will be imposed on the com-
pany as a result of its operations in a particular country, this risk would need to be
disclosed if the sanctions were likely to have a material impact on the company. Like-
wise, if it is reasonably likely that public opposition to the company would have a mate-
rially adverse effect on the operations of the company, this risk would also need to be
disclosed.
Id. (introducing the concept of probability versus magnitude, which was also part of the materi-
ality test articulated by Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
280. See Jeffrey- Cohen, Foreign Issuers and the SEC: Wrestling with Troubling Issues,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at 9; Thomas J. Rice & Andrew B. David, New Direction in SEC Policy
Expands Disclosure Requirements Foreign Issuers Face in the United States, METRO. CORP.
CouNs., Aug. 2001, at 4.
281. See Gary G. Yerkey, SEC Will Not Seek New Data from Foreign Firms on Overseas Deal-
ings, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1441 (Oct. 8, 2001).
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C. The SEC Office of Global Security Risk
Thinking about the relationships between financial markets and se-
curities issues shifted in the wake of September 11th and the account-
ing scandals that led not only to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act but also to the ouster of Chairman Pitt from the SEC. In 2004,
Congress directed the SEC to establish the Office of Global Security
Risk (OGSR). Part of the Division of Corporation Finance, the
OGSR's role is to increase "the investing public's access to the infor-
mation it needs about any public company to make an informed in-
vestment decision, including material information about global
security risk. '28 2
At the time it was established, the mandate of the OGSR was to
"ensure that companies listed on U.S. exchanges disclose whether
they are doing business in states designated by the State Department
as sponsoring terrorism. ' 283 The OGSR was tasked with
establishing a process by which the SEC can identify all companies
traded on U.S. exchanges that are operating in states designated as
State Sponsors of Terrorism [and] ensuring that all companies
traded on U.S. exchanges that are operating in states designated as
State Sponsors of Terrorism are disclosing those activities to
investors. 284
282. SEC, Office of Global Security Risk, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/global-
secrisk.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). The OGSR was established in response to a directive in
the House-Senate conference reports that accompanied the Fiscal Year 2004 appropriations bill
that funded the SEC. See H.R. REP. No. 108-401, at 639 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No.
108-221, at 151 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
283. New SEC Office to Ensure Firms Disclose Connections to States Sponsoring Terrorism, 36
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 241 (Feb. 9, 2004).
284. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, SEC DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS RELATED TO STATE SPON-
SORS OF TERRORISM 2 (2007), available at http://www.adrbnymellon.com/files/S021523.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2010). On March 31, 2004, then-SEC Chairman William Donaldson described
the OGSR's objectives:
[T]o identify companies whose activities raise concern about global security risks that
are material to investors; to obtain appropriate disclosure where merited; and to share
information as necessary and appropriate with other key government agencies respon-
sible for tracking terrorist financing.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
for 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Re-
lated Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. 488 (2004) (statement of Wil-
liam H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC). Chairman Donaldson also testified,
The Office of Global Security Risk will focus on asymmetric risk by assisting review
staff in giving consideration to whether U.S. or foreign companies that are registered
with the SEC have operations or other exposure with or in areas of the world that may
subject it and its investors to material risks, trends or uncertainties. This consideration
would include whether a company has operations in a country or area of activity where
political, economic or other risks exist that are material, or whether a company faces
public or government opposition, boycotts, litigation, or similar circumstances that are
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The House Committee Report that instructed the SEC to establish
the OGSR noted its concern that "American investors may be unwit-
tingly investing in companies with ties to countries that sponsor ter-
rorism and countries linked to human rights violations. '285 The
Committee went on to say, "[A] company's association with sponsors
of terrorism and human rights abuses, no matter how large or small,
can have a material adverse effect on a public company's operations,
financial condition, earnings, and stock prices, all of which can nega-
tively affect the value of an investment. '286
D. The Pension Fund Letters
In June 2005, representatives of fifty public employee retirement
systems, under strong pressure to divest from companies doing busi-
ness in Sudan, wrote to the SEC and the Departments of State, Trea-
sury, and Commerce and asked for "assistance in identifying any
publicly traded companies that are of concern to the United States
government for doing business with, or having business ties to, entities
that support terrorism or threaten U.S. humanitarian goals" (the
"June 3 Letter"). 28 7 Investors objected to pension fund investments in
companies doing business in countries that were subject to U.S. sanc-
tions for a variety of interconnected reasons: moral outrage, low toler-
ance for the risk to the company's share value from business in such
countries, concern about bad publicity, and the impact on the com-
pany's reputation. Some states had required divestment, and the pen-
reasonably likely to have a material adverse impact on a company's financial condition
or results of operations.
Id.
285. H.R. REP. No. 108-221, at 151 (2003). The House Report specified,
The duties of this office shall include, but not be limited to: (1) establishing a process by
which the SEC identifies all companies on U.S. exchanges operating in State Depart-
ment designated terrorist-sponsoring states; (2) ensuring that all companies sold on
U.S. exchanges operating in State Department-designated terrorist-sponsoring states
are disclosing such activities to investors; (3) implementing enhanced disclosure re-
quirements based on the asymmetric nature of the risk to corporate share value and
reputation stemming from business interests in these higher risk countries; (4) coordi-
nating with other government agencies to ensure the sharing of relevant information
across the Federal government; and (5) initiating a global dialogue to ensure that for-
eign corporations whose shares are traded in the United States are properly disclosing




287. Letter from Gail Stone, Executive Dir., Ark. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. et al., to E.
Anthony Wayne, Interim Under Sec'y for Econ., Bus. & Agric. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State et al.
1 (June 3, 2005), http://www.nasra.org/resources/terrorism/Joint%20Sanctions%20Letter.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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sion funds could not determine from available disclosure which
companies conducted the problematic activities.
In the June 3 Letter, the pension funds stated that they needed in-
formation about these entities to "ensure that [they were] not inadver-
tently acting in conflict with the foreign policy and humanitarian goals
of the United States, thereby subjecting [their] members to excessive
investment risk."' 288 The pension funds pointed out that "existing laws
require your agencies to identify, monitor and sanction companies
with business or financial ties to terrorist sponsoring countries, '28 9
and they specifically referred to the SEC's mandate from Congress to
establish a process to identify such companies and to ensure that their
activities are disclosed to investors. 290 The pension funds complained,
"At this time, no comprehensive list or report of such companies has
been created."'291
Three days later, officials from national organizations representing
state auditors, state retirement administrators, public employee retire-
ment systems, state legislatures, and teacher retirement funds wrote to
the same four agencies (the "June 6 Letter"), both to express support
for the public pension fund position in the June 3 Letter and to press
for public disclosure by the four agencies of the "identity of compa-
nies that, by virtue of their business or business ties in terrorist spon-
soring countries, are acting contrary to U.S. foreign policy and
humanitarian interests. '292  The June 6 Letter described a meeting
that the organizations and the OGSR had held earlier in the year, and
the OGSR's decision, at that time, not to disclose its correspondence
or its findings to the public. The June 6 Letter urged the SEC and the
other agencies to "[m]andate readily accessible disclosures" and to
"[p]rovide a searchable, publicly available database ...of publicly
held companies with material business or operations in nations classi-
fied as supporting terrorism or subject to sanctions. '293
In short, by 2005, many U.S. institutional investors were concerned
about inadvertently investing in companies doing business in sanc-
288. Id.
289. Id. at 2.
290. See id. This is presumed to refer to the establishment of the OGSR, which is discussed
supra Part IV.C.
291. Id.
292. See Letter from Cornelia Chebinou, Nat'l Ass'n of State Auditors, Comptrollers & Trea-
surers et al., to E. Anthony Wayne, Interim Under Sec'y for Econ., Bus. & Agric. Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State et al. 1 (June 6, 2005), http://www.nasact.org/downloads/CRC/LOC/
06_05_NO.pension-fund.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
293. Id. at 1-2.
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tioned countries, and by extension, they were concerned about the
adequacy of U.S. securities disclosure requirements.
E. Getting Disclosure and Making it Available
1. A Slow Start for the OGSR
Between 2005 and 2007, the OGSR sent numerous letters to report-
ing companies asking whether they were doing business in or with
SSTs. Nevertheless, the OGSR was perceived as having gotten off to
a slow start. In a 2007 letter to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, Sen-
ator Chris Dodd, who was then the Senate Banking Committee Chair-
man, wrote,
I understand that the SEC's efforts have long been underway to
outfit the Office of Global Security Risk fully with adequate staff
and resources. But I remain concerned about the pace at which
such efforts have been pursued. It is critically important that the
intent of Congress be fully followed as soon as possible, particularly
given the importance of this office's missions to promoting human
rights, U.S. security interests, and investor knowledge. 294
Senator Dodd also noted the national security implications of "Ameri-
can investors unknowingly promoting terrorist states through certain
key investments," and he stated, "I remain particularly concerned
about the ability of shareholders to access reliable information regard-
ing publicly traded companies' business transactions involving Iran
and Sudan. '295
In response to "the urging of certain members of Congress to ex-
pand the role of the OGSR and certain officials and investors to make
existing disclosure of business in or with State Sponsors of Terrorism
easier to find," 296 SEC Chairman Christopher Cox agreed,
No investor should ever have to wonder whether his or her invest-
ments or retirement savings are indirectly subsidizing a terrorist ha-
ven or genocidal state. The law already requires companies to
report on any material activities in a country the Secretary of State
294. Letter from Sen. Chris Dodd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Dev., to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (May 31, 2007), http://dodd.senate.gov/?q=node/3923
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010); see Dodd Urges SEC to Ensure Disclosure About Firms in States
Sponsoring Terrorism, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 874, 875 (June. 4, 2007) (quoting Senator
Dodd as "concerned about the pace at which such efforts [to get the OGSR equipped with staff
and resources] have been pursued").
295. Letter from Sen. Chris Dodd, supra note 294.
296. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 284, at 3.
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has formally designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Our role is to
make that information readily accessible to the investing public. 297
2. The Web Tool
On June 25, 2007, the SEC introduced a web tool, called Software
Tool for Investors Seeking Information on Companies' Activities in
Countries Known to Sponsor Terrorism (the "Web Tool"), that facili-
tated investors' ability298 to search documents that are filed by issuers
for references to activity in sanctioned countries. 299 All of the infor-
mation was already available using the SEC's Electronic Data Gather-
ing Analysis and Retrieval system (EDGAR), but the Web Tool made
it easier to find information that companies had disclosed about activi-
ties in, for example, the Sanctioned Countries. The database was or-
ganized by country (SST) and provided direct links to specific
companies' EDGAR disclosures. 300 The Web Tool did not change the
definition of what had to be disclosed. The Web Tool merely made
any information disclosed by the issuer more accessible to investors.
As soon as it was online, the Web Tool was inundated by hits.
Chairman Christopher Cox reported that "[b]etween June 25, when
the web tool was unveiled, through July 16, visitors have 'hit' material
posted on the site well over 150,000 times. Iran was the country most
frequently clicked on, followed by Cuba, Sudan, North Korea, and
Syria. ' 30 1 The Web Tool was widely criticized by public companies,
securities industry professionals, some members of Congress, 30 2 and
even one of the SEC Commissioners. 30 3 Many reporting companies
297. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adds Software Tool for Investors Seeking Information on
Companies' Activities in Countries Known to Sponsor Terrorism (June 25, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-121.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
298. The web tool was located in the, "Investor Information" section of the SEC website. See
id.
299. See id.
300. See Paul Michalski & Kimberley S. Drexler, A Snapshot of the SEC and Global Security
Risk Disclosure Today, in How TO COMPLETE YOUR SECURITIES OFFERINGS ON A TIMELY BA-
SIS 2008, at 135 (2008).
301. Press Release, SEC, Statement by Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Chris-
topher Cox Concerning Companies' Activities in Countries Known to Sponsor Terrorism (July
20, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-138.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
302. Congressman Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,
wrote to Chairman Christopher Cox of the SEC on July 12, 2007: "I hope you will give serious
consideration to devising either a more rigorous, materiality-based methodology for developing
the list you are presenting to investors or else eliminating the webpage entirely." Press Release,
House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Frank Letter to Cox Regarding SEC List of Terrorist-Financing
States (July 13, 2007), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs-dem/press07l307.shtml
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
303. See Rachelle Younglai, SEC Member Criticizes "Terrorist" Watch List, REUTERS, July 19,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUSN1920647120070719 (last vis-
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opposed the database as a "blacklist" because simply being listed in a
part of the SEC website identified with SSTs was prejudicial to them.
In almost all cases, the activity described was lawful under applicable
usually non-U.S. law. In some cases (for example, Western Union)
the activity was explicitly licensed by OFAC. The Web Tool was criti-
cized as over-inclusive because "it captured (and potentially stigma-
tized) any issuer that disclosed even benign activities in [an SST]," and
as under-inclusive because it only included issuers' 2006 annual re-
ports (Form 10-K or Form 20-F) and not disclosure made after those
reports. 30
4
3. The Concept Release
The SEC suspended the Web Tool on July 25, 2007.305 On Novem-
ber 16, 2007, the SEC solicited comments on the Web Tool and the
disclosure of business in SSTs in the Concept Release on Mechanisms
to Access Disclosures Relating to Business Activities in or with Coun-
tries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism (the "Concept Re-
lease"). 30 6 The Concept Release articulated the SEC's understanding
of the disclosure requirements with respect to business activities in or
with SSTs:
The federal securities laws do not impose a specific disclosure re-
quirement that addresses business activities in or with a country
based upon its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. How-
ever, the federal securities laws do require disclosure of business
activities in or with a State Sponsor of Terrorism if this constitutes
material information that is necessary to make a company's state-
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading. 30 7
In addition, the Concept Release briefly summarized what the SEC
understands as the general definition of materiality: "[T]he Supreme
Court has determined information to be material if there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the informa-
tion important in making an investment decision or if the information
would significantly alter the total mix of available information. ' 30 8
ited Feb. 10, 2010) (reporting that Commissioner Paul Atkins had stated in an interview with
Reuters that the SEC needed to either fix or withdraw the Web Tool as soon as possible).
304. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 284, at 3.
305. See Press Release, supra note 301.
306. Concept Release on Mechanisms to Access Disclosures Relating to Business Activities in
or with Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, SEC Release Nos. 33-8860, 34-
56803 (Nov. 16, 2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 65,862 (Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Concept Release].
307. Id. at 65,863 (citing Rule 408 and Rule 12b-20).
308. Id. at 65,863 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
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With respect to the possibility that a different standard might be
applicable to activities in the SSTs, the SEC clarified,
The materiality standard applicable to a company's activities in or
with State Sponsors of Terrorism is the same materiality standard
applicable to all other corporate activities. Any such material infor-
mation not covered by a specific rule or regulation must be dis-
closed if necessary to make the required statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. The
materiality standard's extensive regulatory and judicial history helps
companies and their counsel to interpret and apply it consistently,
and we remain committed to employing this standard to company
disclosure regarding business activities in or with State Sponsors of
Terrorism. 309
Moreover, the Concept Release asked whether the SEC should con-
tinue to interpret materiality in the context of SSTs in the same way it
does when reviewing disclosure related to other corporate activities
that are not covered by a specific rule or regulation. 310
The SEC received comment letters ranging from twenty-page mem-
oranda from international financial institutions to handwritten notes
from individuals. Many comments were about how the Web Tool
worked. Of the twenty-eight comment letters received, just over half
were critical of the Web Tool.311 In response to the question about
whether the SEC had properly described materiality, about a third of
the letters312 either assumed that materiality in the context of SSTs
was the same as in other contexts 313 or explicitly supported making no
309. Id.
310. See id. The SEC also asked whether information about companies' activities in or with
SSTs was important to investors in making investment decisions. See id.
311. There is always, of course, considerable self-selection in submitting SEC concept release
comment letters.
312. See Letter from William A. Reinsch, President, USA Engage, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y
SEC 3 (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Diana L Preston, Managing Dir. &
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, and David G. Strongin, Managing Dir., SIFMA, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec'y, SEC (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Lawrence R. Uhlick, CEO,
Inst. of Int'l Bankers, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC 4 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author);
Letter from Judith A. Lee and James D. Slear, Counsel, W. Union, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y,
SEC (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Michael J. Ryan Jr., Senior Vice President
& Executive Dir., U.S. Chamber Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Nancy M. Morris,
Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 4,2008) (on file with author); Letter from Abigail Arms, Partner, Capital Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
313. Several letters took the existing standard for granted. See Letter from Sepideh Behram,
Senior Compliance Counsel, Ctr. for Regulatory Compliance, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec'y, SEC 2 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Christopher L. White, Executive Vice
President, Gen. Counsel & Assistant Sec'y, AdvaMed, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC 3 (Jan.
18, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Dr. Werner Schnappauf, Dir. & Gen. Member of the
Presidential Bd., Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC
2 (Jan. 21, 2008) (on file with author).
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changes to the standard. Another, smaller, group of the comment let-
ters advocated a broader or specialized standard for disclosure of ac-
tivities in or with SSTs.314 As of this writing, over two years later, the
SEC has not responded to the comments. The Web Tool remains
suspended.
In the absence of the Web Tool, investors seeking disclosed infor-
mation about a company's activities in the Sanctioned Countries use
the more cumbersome "full text" search engine on the SEC webpage
to search for, for example, references to "Cuba" on a company-by-
company basis. A couple of the comment letters submitted in re-
sponse to the Concept Release praised the existing EDGAR search as
adequate for investors seeking information about business operations
in or with SSTs. 315 The Organization for International Investment ar-
gued that by using the advanced full text search function, investors
can "quickly and efficiently" find disclosures made by a company
about its activities in any particular country. 316 This, of course, as-
sumes that such disclosures have been made. Part V below describes
empirical research demonstrating that such disclosure is often
unavailable.
F. Has the OGSR Made a Difference?
Since its establishment in 2004, the OGSR's activities have included
sending numerous inquiry letters to reporting companies asking about
their operations in the Sanctioned Countries.317 In his May 2007 Sen-
ate testimony, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox stated that in the prior
year, the OGSR had issued comments to approximately 212 compa-
nies. 318 Some but not nearly all of the OGSR comment letters and the
companies' responses are available (some in redacted form and some
314. See Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli, State Comptroller, N.Y., to Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC 2 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Rebecca W. Goldman, VP
Law, Rockwell Automation, to SEC (Nov. 28, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from Robert F.
Milligan, Interim Executive Dir., State Bd. of Admin. of Fla., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC
2-3 (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Robert "Kinney" Poynter, Executive Dir.,
Nat'l Ass'n of State Auditors, Controllers & State Treasurers et al., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y,
SEC 3 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
315. I spent hundreds of hours looking for disclosures about companies with business in SSTs,
and I found the EDGAR system to be difficult to use.
316. Letter from Todd M. Malan, President & CEO, Org. for Int'l Inv., to Nancy M. Morris,
Sec'y, SEC 3 (Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with author); see also Letter from Philippe de Buck, Sec'y
Gen., Bus. Europe, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC 1 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
317. See, e.g., Rachel McTague, Ford Responds to SEC Staff on Activities Relating to Iran,
Syria, Sudan, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2005 (Dec. 4, 2006).
318. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Servs. and General Government of the S. Comm. on Appropri-
ations, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC).
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in full) on EDGAR. 319 During the four-year period between January
1, 2006 and January 1, 2010, OGSR uploaded onto EDGAR 420 let-
ters that were addressed to over 200 companies. 320 The research
presented in the next Section will discuss some of the OGSR's corre-
spondence with public companies about their reported (either in dis-
closure, on their website, or in the media) activities in or with the
Sanctioned Countries.
The OGSR is not, however, attempting to change the standard for
whether disclosure is required. In requesting additional information,
the OGSR is working within the parameters of the existing "material-
ity" definition: "The Commission's disclosure-based regulatory ap-
proach has served the investing public and this agency well over the
years, and the standard for disclosure-that of materiality-has long
been the foundation of the Commission's work. We are committed to
maintaining the materiality standard as the basis for our disclosure-
based approach. ' 321 The OGSR sees itself as tasked with enforcing
the existing materiality standard, not changing it.322
G. Private Sector Databases
In the absence of an adequate official source of information about
U.S. exchange-listed companies with operations in countries that are
subject to U.S. economic sanctions for their sponsorship of terrorism,
a private industry has developed. At the institutional investor level,
for example, World-Check provides a database of known heightened
risk to individuals and businesses.323 World-Check claims that its sub-
scribing customers include more than 3,000 institutions, including over
90% of the world's largest banks and "200 enforcement and regula-
tory agencies. '324
Individual and institutional investors, as well as asset managers and
mutual fund providers, can also purchase private global security risk
assessment services from entities such as RiskMetrics or Conflict Se-
319. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Staff to Publicly Release Comment Letters and Responses
(June 24, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-89.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
320. A list of companies to which the OGSR wrote letters that are available on EDGAR is on
file with the author.
321. SEC, Office of Global Security Risk, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfinrglobal-
secrisk.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
322. The materiality standard is flexible. It is possible that by making more companies dis-
close, the OGSR may make operations in Sanctioned Countries more prominent in investors'
minds, and that prominence may make such activities material to more investors.
323. See World-Check.com, About World-Check, http://www.world-check.com/overview/ (last




curities Advisory Group (CSAG). 325 Founded in the weeks after the
September 11th attacks, CSAG is an independent research provider
that specializes in identifying and assessing publicly traded companies
that have business activities in or with countries on the U.S. State De-
partment's list of SSTs.326 CSAG has also partnered with FTSE
Group to provide a "Terror-Free" index,32 7 and CSAG identifies mu-
tual funds that offer "Terror-Free products."
The development of the private services adds another wrinkle to the
question of whether companies should disclose activities in the Sanc-
tioned Countries on the basis that the activities are material. Some
investors argue that disclosure standards should not be strengthened
because, thanks to the market, the current materiality standard results
in sufficient disclosure for most investors, and private services are
available for investors that want additional, specific types of informa-
tion. A number of the comment letters submitted in response to the
Concept Release praised the private services, calling them "thought-
ful, well-researched, and competitively priced. '328
Others objected to this "outsourcing" and questioned whether it is
appropriate for the private sector to provide this information. In the
June 3 Letter, the pension funds discussed the possibility of using pri-
vate entities to perform a screening function, but insisted that "the
U.S. government is the only credible and centralized authority to
identify, monitor, and report domestic and international companies
that are operating in such countries and thereby may be acting con-
trary to U.S. foreign policy and humanitarian objectives. '329 The June
6 Letter also urged that "the federal government is the only credible
centralized authority having the power to identify publicly held com-
panies with material business or operations in nations classified as
supporting terrorism or subject to sanctions, and to bring this type of
325. See Conflict Securities Advisory Group, About CSAG, http://www.conflictsecurities.com/
about/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
326. See id.
327. See Terror-Free Investing, http://www.terrorfreeinvesting.com/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2010).
328. Letter from Paul D. Glenn, Counsel, Inv. Adviser Ass'n, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y,
SEC 2 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with the author); see Letter from Michael J. Ryan, Jr., Senior Vice
President & Executive Dir., U.S. Chamber Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec'y, SEC 2 (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with the author); Letter from Todd D. Malan, Presi-
dent & CEO, Org. for Int'l Inv., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC 3-4 (Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with
the author) (advocating the use of private and not-for-profit sources of information).
329. Letter from Gail Stone, supra note 287, at 2.
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information to light in the investment marketplace. ' '330 The organiza-
tions rejected the use of private services, arguing that
fee-based lists provided by private organizations can have a high
degree of subjectivity and may not include credible or authoritative
information sanctioned by the federal government.. They are also
not without significant transaction costs and investment implica-
tions. Possible risks to corporate share value and reputation stem-
ming from business interests in higher-risk countries cannot be
properly assessed unless the information is credible, transparent and
readily available. 331
Nevertheless, in the absence of an accessible, publicly available
database, investors, including public employee retirement funds, are
using the private services.332
H. Business Dealings in SSTs Are Material
This brief history of the disclosure issues presented by companies
doing business in or with the Sanctioned Countries demonstrates a
proposition that should have been obvious all along: information
about a company's business dealings in or with an SST is material in-
formation, something that reasonable investors want to know. Com-
panies doing business in SSTs often argue that such activity does not
need to be disclosed if it is not a substantial part of their global opera-
tions. However, these arguments are belied by the attention given to
offerings like PetroChina, the explicit interest of institutional inves-
tors, the establishment of a new office within the SEC, the SEC's crea-
330. Letter from Cornelia Chebinou, supra note 292, at 1. The Concept Release comment
letter submitted by the national auditors, legislatures, and retirement organizations also dis-
cussed the availability and adequacy of private services to provide information about activities in
or with SSTs. See Letter from Robert "Kinney" Poynter, Executive Dir., Nat'l Ass'n of State
Auditors, Controllers & State Treasurers, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, SEC, supra note 314. The
organizations argued that identifying companies that operate in states that sponsor terrorism
involves judgments that should not be delegated to non-governmental organizations or vendors
that may be motivated more by profit than U.S. foreign policy. Id. at 3.
331. Letter from Cornelia Chebinou, Nat'l Ass'n of State Auditors, Comptrollers & Treasur-
ers et al., to E. Anthony Wayne, Interim Under Sec'y for Econ., Bus. & Agric. Affairs et al.,
supra note 292, at 2.
332. On September 7, 2005, New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., as the
custodian and investment advisor to the New York City pension funds, and the same comptroller
who exchanged correspondence with PetroChina in 2000, announced that he had sent letters to
twenty-four companies requesting that each company review its business ties to Sudan, examine
any potential financial and reputational risks, and report its findings to shareholders. The com-
panies that received letters had been identified by a private service as having business ties to
Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, and North Korea. Comptroller Thompson's press release identi-
fied the companies by name and disclosed the funds' holdings in each. See New York City
Comptroller Thompson Announces List of Companies Urged to Review Business Ties to Sudan




tion of the Web Tool for investor use, the issuance of the Concept
Release, the development of a private market in the non-disclosed in-
formation, the sustained attention of NGOs, and the extensive efforts
of firms to resist legal requirements that their activities be disclosed.
Clearly, the fact that a company is doing business in or with an SST is
material to many reasonable investors and should be disclosed.
The technical debates over the Web Tool and the use of private ser-
vices, and the broader discussions of materiality should not, however,
be allowed to obscure more fundamental questions about the scope of
U.S sanctions and how the securities laws should handle information
in the post-September 11th world. Is the disclosure system, and in
particular the concept of materiality, functioning to give investors the
information that they need about companies doing business in or with
the Sanctioned Countries? Five years after being established, what
has the OGSR accomplished? What kinds of information are compa-
nies disclosing? As the next part demonstrates, at the present time,
the securities laws are not achieving much meaningful disclosure.
V. THE DATABASE AND ANALYSIS
A. Methodology
1. Establishing a List of Companies Doing Business in or with
Iran, Sudan, or Cuba
The first step in evaluating existing disclosure was to create a list of
companies doing business in the Sanctioned Countries (the "Prelimi-
nary List"). Unfortunately no comprehensive list is publicly available.
This Article's research, therefore, proceeded on a new database that
was constructed for the purpose. 333
a. Sources
The sources of the data were diverse. Mainstream and business me-
dia reports (for example, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times,
and Business Week) contained variable amounts and types of informa-
tion about companies' activities in or with the Sanctioned Countries.
Most of this information was hard to locate in a methodical way. For
example, newswires were full of information about the Sanctioned
Countries, but typing general search terms like "doing business in"
and "Iran" into a Google search yielded 3,560,000 results. There were
a handful of U.S. newspaper articles and television shows that focused
333. Ideally, the database could be expanded and kept up to date through the collaboration of
others.
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on U.S. companies doing business in SSTs,334 but a company's invest-
ment in a Sanctioned Country was often only newsworthy if invest-
ment was large enough to be financially significant to the company's
overall operations. 335 Also, many reports that mentioned companies'
operations in the Sanctioned Countries only mentioned them in pass-
ing and in the context of a report on another topic. 336
Of course, once a violation of U.S. sanctions laws was alleged, there
was often a media report and, at some later point, a government press
release or statement.337 Moreover, in the case of a violation of U.S.
sanctions laws, the business activities leading to the violation had to
be disclosed not because of general notions of materiality, but because
of the specific requirements of Regulation S-K. 338 The goal here,
however, was to find companies that were operating lawfully (at least
vis-a-vis the sanctions regime) in the Sanctioned Countries and to ana-
lyze their disclosure.
NGOs turned out to be the most fruitful source of public informa-
tion.339 In response to public concern over companies' activities in the
Sanctioned Countries, several organizations that focus on particular
countries have compiled lists of companies doing business there. Two
of the most useful were United Against Nuclear Iran340 and the Sudan
334. See, e.g., The O'Reilly Factor: U.S. Companies Doing Business with Iran, Syria (Fox News
television broadcast Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,325351,00.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010); Sharon Theimer, From Bull Semen to Bras,
Iran Still Buys American, USA TODAY, July 8, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2008-07-08-350908565x.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2010); U.S. Companies Are Operating in Iran,
CNN, May 29, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/2003/05/29/news/iransanctions/indez.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2010).
335. See, e.g., Agence France Presse, Iran and China Sign Oilfield Development Contract, Jan.
14, 2009, http://www.iranfocus.com/en (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (discussing the North Azade-
gan development); CNPC Looking at Pars LNG Deal, OIL & GAS INsIGHT, Oct. 2008 (discuss-
ing Pars liquefied natural gas development).
336. The point of the Article might be, instead, the health of Fidel Castro in Cuba or post-
election violence in Iran.
337. See, e.g., Agence France Press, Japan Banks to Refrain from Deals with Iran Bank, Sept.
16, 2006 (regarding Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.); Aaron Lucchetti & Jay Solomon,
Credit Suisse's Secret Deals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, at A3; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Commerce Departments Announce $9.4 Million Settlement with
DHL (Aug. 6, 2009), http:/Iwww.ustreas.gov/press/releasesltg259.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010)
(concerning shipments to Iran, Sudan, and Syria and failures to meet recordkeeping
requirements).
338. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2009).
339. Of course, much of the information that such organizations used to create their lists also
came from press reports, but the NGOs also often review companies' websites.
340. See United Against Nuclear Iran, http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010).
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Divestment Task Force.341 United Against Nuclear Iran publishes a
publicly available registry of companies doing business in Iran.342
Through the first quarter of 2009, the Sudan Divestment Task Force, a
project of the Genocide Intervention Network, published a free list of
companies doing business in or with Sudan.343 In June 2009, however,
the Sudan Divestment Task Force was replaced by the Conflict Risk
Network, which describes itself as "a network of high-net individual
and institutional investors whose combined efforts to mitigate conflict
risk and increase responsible foreign investment will result in the pro-
tection of civilians and improvement of investment returns. '' 344 The
Conflict Risk Network requires a paid subscription for access to infor-
mation about companies doing business in Sudan.
Thus, all of the information used to create the Preliminary List of
companies doing business in the Sanctioned Countries was publicly
available. The list does not rely on any information only available on
subscription services (such as Westlaw and LexisNexis). It also does
not draw from any of the private security risk services (such as World-
check, CSAG, and Riskmetrics). 345
b. Qualitative Assessment of the Data
Information about companies doing business in the Sanctioned
Countries gathered from different media and NGO sources varied in
depth and quality. In some cases, sources discussed investments in
detail, but most sources made only a passing reference to a company
doing business in a Sanctioned Country.
In addition, the accuracy of the information gathered through me-
dia reports was difficult to assess. Certainly some sources were more
credible than others; data gathered from The Economist was more
341. See Conflict Risk Network, Genocide Intervention, http://cm.genocideintervention.net/
(last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
342. See United Against Nuclear Iran, The Iran Business Registry, http://www.united-
sgainstnucleariran.com/ibr (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
343. See Conflict Risk Network, Welcome to the Conflict Risk Network, http://
crn.genocideintervention.net/node (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
344. Id. The Sudan Divestment Task Force was also an initiative of the Genocide Interven-
tion Network. Information used to create the Preliminary List of companies for this Article was
limited to the last free Sudan Company Report (First Quarter 2009).
345. Of course, some of the information that is publicly available does reflect private services'
research. For example, a CaIPERs letter that listed companies in which it would not invest cited
information that was purchased from Riskmetrics. See Memorandum from Anne Stausboll, In-
terim Chief Investment Officer, CalPERS, to Members of the Investment Committee 2-3 (Aug.
18, 2008) (on file with the author).
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likely to be true than information found on BobHatesCuba.com. 346
However, verification of any of the media reports was difficult.
While frustrating for scholarly purposes, the difficulties in data col-
lection and assessment demonstrate an important policy point: Even
with determined effort, investors have a hard time getting information
about a company's activities in the Sanctioned Countries. Little infor-
mation is available. The available information is different for each
company, so comparing companies is difficult. Even if the informa-
tion can be found, there is no sure way to know how accurate it is. 347
2. Cross Referencing with SEC Disclosure
The Preliminary List included 208 large multinational companies
that were credibly reported as having operations in or with the Sanc-
tioned Countries.348 The next step was to identify which of the com-
panies on the Preliminary List filed searchable disclosures with the
SEC.
a. Which Companies File Documents with the SEC?
Most companies that file documents with the SEC are public com-
panies.3 49 Public companies include companies with securities listed
on a national securities exchange °350 companies traded on the over-
the-counter market if they have at least 500 shareholders and $10 mil-
lion in assets,35 1 and companies that have filed Securities Act registra-
tion statements (that is, companies that made IPOs in the United
States).35 2 These companies are required to file reports periodically
with the SEC.353 Most reporting companies are U.S. companies, but
some are organized under the laws of another country and access the
346. There is no website called BobHatesCuba.com. It was invented to avoid singling out any
particular site.
347. One of the benefits of SEC-required disclosure is the credibility of the information pro-
vided. Companies will make a greater effort to provide accurate, truthful information in order
to avoid penalties connected with filing a false report with the SEC.
348. Research conducted by the Conflict Securities Advisory Group estimates that there are
over 350 publicly traded companies worldwide with active, nonhumanitarian business ties to
Iran, and over 200 with such ties to Sudan. See Foreign Policy Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (state-
ment of Roger Robinson, Jr., President and CEO, Conflict Securities Advisory Group).
349. Although sometimes a company that issues American Depositary Receipts (ADRS) will
file some limited information.
350. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006).
351. See id. § 781(g).
352. See id. § 78o. Most IPOs will trigger Exchange Act Section 12(g) and, if on an exchange,
Exchange Act Section 12(a). Exchange Act Section 15(d) will catch companies that sell debt to
the public but keep their equity closely held.
353. For example, Form 10-K, Form 20-F, and Form 40-F reports are filed annually; Form 10-
Q reports are filed quarterly, and Form 8-K and Form 6-K reports are filed occasionally.
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U.S. capital markets by selling securities in the United States. 354 Non-
U.S. companies may sell securities directly or through an American
Depositary Receipt (ADR) program.35 5 In December 2008, there
were 1,024 foreign companies registered and reporting with the
SEC.
3 5 6
Foreign companies made up the bulk of the Preliminary List be-
cause U.S.-incorporated companies can only do business in Iran and
Sudan through certain non-U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates, and they
cannot do business in Cuba at all (not even indirectly). 357 The nar-
rowing of the Preliminary List of companies to reporting companies
yielded a smaller list of 142 companies (the "Pool")358 that issue secur-
ities to the public in the United States, and that have operations in or
with the Sanctioned Countries. 359 Of the 142 companies in the Pool,
33 are U.S. companies, 61 are organized in European Union coun-
tries, 360 and 18 are Japanese.
354. Many of these are foreign private issuers. A "foreign private issuer" is defined in Ex-
change Act Rule 3b-4(c) to include any corporation or other organization incorporated or organ-
ized under the laws of any foreign country, unless
[m]ore than 50 percent of [its] outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly
held of record by residents of the United States; and [either] [t]he majority of the
executive officers or directors are United States citizens or residents; [m]ore than 50
percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United States; or [t]he business of
the issuer is administered principally in the United States.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2009).
355. ADRs are U.S. securities that represent a specified number of a foreign company's
shares. See SEC, International Investing, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubslininvest.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2010). J.P. Morgan, which created the first depositary receipt program in 1927,
estimates that more than 2000 issuers from more than 80 markets have established depositary
receipt programs, and that depositary receipts account for more than 15% of the U.S. equity
market. J.P. Morgan, About DRs, http://www.adr.com/Reference/Reference.aspx?Ll=About
DRs&L2=DRslntro (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Foreign companies with ADR programs file
Form F-6 with the SEC, and more limited disclosure is made on EDGAR.
356. SEC, Number of Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/
foreignsummary2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
357. See supra Part II.D.1.
358. Not all of the companies in the Pool are still reporting companies. Seventeen of the
companies in the Pool have delisted from U.S. exchanges since the SEC promulgated Rule 12h-6
in 2007. See Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of a Class of Securities Under
Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 55,540, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,934 (Apr. 5, 2007) (making it
easier for foreign private issuers to delist). It should be noted that one instance of delisting, that
of NEC Corp., was involuntary. See In the Matter of NEC Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
57974 (June 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-57974.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2010) (revoking registration of securities).
359. A summary of this database is on file with the author.
360. This includes sixteen from the United Kingdom, twelve from France, and ten from
Germany.
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b. "Searchability"
The Pool was also limited by the dates of the reports that were filed
with the SEC: the company had to have filed documents within the
last four years-between January 1, 2006 and January 1, 2010. This
limitation was imposed by the capabilities of the SEC website. Using
EDGAR, only disclosure filed in the last four years can be searched in
"full text. '361 In other words, if an investor is concerned that a partic-
ular company is doing business in Cuba, then, by using the Advanced
Search tool, she can enter the name of the company and the term
"Cuba," and any documents filed by that company with the SEC in
the last four years that contain the word "Cuba" will appear on a list.
Maybe. Sometimes the search will report that, for example, 15 docu-
ments were found, but only 11 will be listed. Sometimes the same
search will yield different results on different days.
To see what the company actually disclosed and what kind of activi-
ties are concerned, the investor then has to open every document pro-
duced by the search and use the "find" (control-F) function to look
for the word "Cuba." The paucity of disclosure is thus aggravated by
the cumbersome method of gathering the information that is
disclosed.
Although the SEC is in the process of adopting a more advanced
data submission and retrieval system called Interactive Data Elec-
tronic Applications (IDEA),362 there is some controversy about when
and how that system will be implemented. In addition, as discussed
below, the benefits to investors from an ability to search for informa-
tion in companies' filed disclosures are limited by the quality of that
disclosure.
3. Limitations and Successes of the Database
The Pool was, of course, incomplete and inconclusive. The media
information it relied on varied in depth and was often impossible to
verify. The SEC disclosure it relied on was difficult to access and
361. Older disclosures can be searched, but every single document has to be opened and
searched separately. For many of these companies, that would be hundreds if not thousands of
documents. One could, of course, limit searches to annual (Form 10-K or Form 20-F) reports,
but data from the past four years showed that the annual reports provide less than half of the
disclosures about business in SSTs that are filed with the SEC.
362. The SEC has been putting into place the "Next Generation EDGAR." See SEC, Search
the Next-Generation EDGAR System, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2010). For example, beginning on August 19, 2009, all EDGAR results pages
displayed direct links to an interactive data viewer for company financials and provided links to
insider transactions reports. This change, however, had no effect on the data or data retrieval
methods used in creating the database for this Article.
2010] 1211
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
probably incomplete. The Pool was not a list of all the companies in
the world that had business operations in or with the Sanctioned
Countries. It was not even a list of all of the companies filing reports
with the SEC that had operations in or with the Sanctioned Countries.
It was a broad sample of such companies that was put together to see
whether the existing regulatory framework elicits the information in-
vestors need and whether it does so in a way they can access. For this
limited purpose, the Pool was successful. The Pool included enough
companies to provide a look at patterns of company behavior and
disclosure.
A review of the disclosure produced by the companies in the Pool
showed a low rate and quality of disclosure. Moreover, insofar as the
policy question is whether investors can assess where their money is
spent, the under-inclusiveness of the database, despite hundreds of
hours of work and study, supports the proposition that important in-
formation about companies' business in and with SSTs is simply
unavailable.
B. Analysis of Correspondence with the SEC
1. What Is in the Correspondence?
In some cases, the SEC, usually through the OGSR, sent inquiries
to companies because those companies referred to a Sanctioned
Country in their periodic disclosure. In other cases, the SEC wrote
because of the lack of such a reference or disclosure in the face of
media reports or a company web page that indicated activity in a
Sanctioned Country.
The SEC/OGSR inquiry letter was often formulaic. It identified the
periodic disclosure in question, it asked a substantive question, and it
asked the company to evaluate the materiality of its operations in or
with a Sanctioned Country. Many of the letters cited specific state
laws, pension fund guidelines, and university policies against investing
in companies with operations in the Sanctioned Country, and asked
the company to respond.
Company responses varied,363 but they generally offered a serious
response to the SEC questions. They set forth the details of the oper-
363. However, the responses that were submitted by companies with the same outside legal
counsel shared some common language. See Letter from Tobias Guldimann, Member of the
Executive Bd. & Chief Risk Officer, Credit Suisse Group, and Urs Rohner, Member of the
Executive Bd. & Gen. Counsel, Credit Suisse Group, to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global
Sec. Risk, SEC (Apr. 28, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1159510/
000090342306000442/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010): Letter from Claus KUhn, CFO,
Bayer Corp., and Roland Hartwig, Gen. Counsel, Bayer Corp., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office
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ations, and they then marched through a discussion of materiality.
Both quantitative and qualitative materiality were often discussed, but
in nearly all cases, the financial impact of the activities in the country
in question was estimated to be less than 1% of the company's total
revenues or assets, which the company then concluded was not mate-
rial.364 The qualitative analysis that followed usually discussed reputa-
tion and share value, but was often influenced by the asserted small
financial impact as well.
A number of responding companies also cited a lack of interest in
the issue on the part of investors. For example, Benetton Group
S.p.A. wrote, "The Company is not aware that any investor in the se-
curities of Benetton has ever made any inquiry regarding activities
carried on in Cuba, Syria, or Iran. ' 36 5 CNOOC Ltd. went even fur-
ther and argued,
[Tihe Company has not received any significant inquiries from its
shareholders or the general public about its affiliates' contacts with
Iran. In fact, we have seen no indication that either the United
States holders of CNOOC Limited's shares (who constitute a very
small percentage of our total shareholders, as discussed below) or
of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1144145/
000090342306001034/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); Letter from Ralf P. Thomas,
Corporate Vice President & Controller, Siemens Corp., and Paul Hobeck, Gen. Counsel, Sie-
mens Corp., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (Feb. 15, 2006), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1135644/000132693206000042/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2010).
364. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin E. Hisko, Corporate Sec'y, Lundin Mining Corp., to Cecilia
D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 3 (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1377085/000120445907001564/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); Letter from
Eckhard MUller, President, Fin. Div., BASF Corp., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global
Sec. Risk, SEC 3 (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024148/
000110465906024537/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13. 2010); Letter from Serkan Okandan,
CFO, Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk,
SEC 5-7 (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1071321/000094787106001671/
filenamel.txt (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); Letter from Michael R. Peterson, Attorney, Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (Aug. 24, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/42582/000095015206007212/filenamel.htm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2010); Letter from David Sach, CFO, Millicom Int'l Cellular S.A., to Andrew Mew,
Senior Staff Accountant, Div. of Corporate Fin., SEC 5 (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/912958/000095010306002736/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); Let-
ter from John D. Soriano, Vice President-Compliance & Deputy Gen. Counsel, Ingersoll-Rand
Co., Ltd., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 3 (Sept. 5, 2008) (on file
with the author); Letter from Tsuneji Uchida, President & COO, Canon Inc., to Cecilia D. Blye,
Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (June 28, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
16988/000095010306001632/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
365. Letter from Massimo Branda, Head of Admin. Tax & Corporate Affairs, Benetton
Group S.p.A., to Michael Moran, Branch Chief, SEC (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/849314/000084931407000001/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
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our shareholders outside the United States are concerned about this
issue. 366
Other companies stated that they were aware of no investor selling its
shares because of the operations in question, which functioned as fur-
ther evidence that the operations were not material. Halliburton ar-
gued in a May 2006 letter, "We are not aware that any person or entity
has made the decision to invest or not to invest in Halliburton based
on activity in Iran, nor do we think it likely that one would do so. ' '367
Several companies also discussed whether divestiture by the pen-
sion funds or educational institutions mentioned by the SEC would
have an impact, and they concluded that such a divesture would not
be material: "Assuming that all such institutions were to divest all of
their Alcatel stockholdings, we do not believe that such divestiture
would have a material impact on the market value of our
securities." 368
The majority of firms responded that their activities in SSTs were
not financially significant (whatever that "significant" number may
be), were not material, and did not have to be disclosed. As Cummins
argued, "We are not aware of any precedent or guidance that requires
disclosure of this business [in sanctioned countries] when the amount
of sales is de minimis. We do not believe that a reasonable investor
would find such information to be material. ' 369
Even companies that disclosed activities in or with a Sanctioned
Country after receiving an SEC inquiry often do so while insisting that
disclosure is not actually required. In a September 2006 letter to the
SEC, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group argued against materiality and
then conceded, "[Mitsubishi] does not believe that its past and current
operations with entities in Iran should be considered a material invest-
366. Letter from Yang Hua, Executive Dir., Executive Vice President & CFO, CNOOC Ltd.,
to Jill S. Davis, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 4 (May 21, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1095595/000095010307001266/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
367. Letter from Margaret Carriere, Senior Vice President & Corporate Sec'y, Halliburton
Co., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (May 26, 2006), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501206000242/filenamel.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2010). This appears to disregard the stated intention of the NYS pension funds. For a similar
argument, see Letter from Jean-Jacques Gathier, Executive Vice President & CFO, LaFarge
S.A., to John Hartz, Senior Assistant Chief Accountant, Division of Corp. Fin., SEC 1 (Jan. 31,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/913785/000119312507017179/filenamel.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2010).
368. Letter from Jean-Pascal Beaufret, CFO, Alcatel-Lucent, to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office
of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) (on file with the author).
369. Letter from Marya M. Rose, Vice-President, Gen. Counsel & Corporate Sec'y, Cummins,
Inc., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief, Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC (Sept. 26, 2008), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/26172/0000026172080000381filenamel.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2010).
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ment risk for investors. Nevertheless, to enhance its ongoing disclo-
sure of potential risks [Mitsubishi] proposes to include additional risk
factor disclosure in its [next] annual report. '370
2. What is the Effect of Correspondence?
The impact of such inquiries seems mixed. Of the 142 companies in
the Pool, 75 (53%) were engaged in correspondence with the SEC
about their operations in the Sanctioned Countries.37' From these 75
companies, the following data were collected: in 47 cases, an inquiry
by the SEC had no marked impact 372 on the disclosure made by the
company; 373 in 21 cases, the company provided better disclosure after
exchanging correspondence with the SEC about their activities in or
with SSTs;3 7 4 and in 7 cases, companies provided less disclosure after
an inquiry from the SEC.375
3. Is Correspondence Disclosure?
When the OGSR first began sending inquiry letters to companies,
they were not made public. Following strong objections from inves-
tors and Congress, the SEC uploaded a large cache of letters, and it
began posting the inquiries and requiring companies to respond via
EDGAR. Currently, much of the correspondence between the SEC
and companies with operations in the Sanctioned Countries is publicly
available.
Nevertheless, correspondence between the SEC and reporting com-
panies does not really constitute disclosure. Letters from the SEC are
not issued to all companies doing business in the Sanctioned Coun-
tries. Companies' responses range from reasoned analysis prepared
by Wall Street law firms to brief one-page answers. There is no stan-
370. See Letter from Tong Yo, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc., to Cecilia D. Blye, Chief,
Office of Global Sec. Risk, SEC 4 (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/
000095014206001655/filenamel.txt (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
371. Of the remaining 67 companies, some may have received letters from and responded to
the OGSR before January 1, 2006, and some may not have received inquiries from the OGSR at
all.
372. Quality of disclosure and impact were judged broadly. Each company's disclosure was
rated "no," "low," "good," or "very good" based on the level of specificity and whether issues
such as U.S. sanctions, materiality, or investor sentiment were mentioned. A category change, as
opposed to a small tweak in the language, was recorded as an impact.
373. Three of those companies subsequently delisted, 5 discontinued their operations in the
country in question, and 4 cases involved a sanctions violation.
374. Two of those companies subsequently delisted, 1 discontinued its activities in the country
in question, and 6 were reported to have committed a sanctions violation.
375. In almost half of those cases, however, the company either delisted or discontinued oper-
ations in the country in question.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
dard format or guidance for answering an SEC inquiry. These are not
documents written for investors. They are not easy to compare. Some
are highly redacted. They sometimes disclose information, but they
are not disclosure for these purposes.
D. Analysis of the Disclosure
1. Quantitative Summary
The following data reflect the disclosures-available on EDGAR-
made by the 142 companies in the Pool in the past four years: 18
(13%) of the companies only mentioned the Sanctioned Countries in
their periodic disclosure; 52 (37%) of the companies mentioned the
Sanctioned Countries in both disclosure and correspondence with the
SEC; 23 (16%) of the companies only discussed the Sanctioned Coun-
tries in correspondence initiated by the SEC; and 49 (35%) of the
companies made no reference to any of the Sanctioned Countries in
any documents filed with the SEC, whether disclosure or correspon-
dence. 376 This means that, at best, 70 (49%)377 of the companies in
the Pool included some mention of the Sanctioned Countries, if only
by using the word "Iran," "Sudan," or "Cuba, '' 378 in their disclosure
that was filed with the SEC.
2. Qualitative Summary
Of course, getting companies to provide some disclosure of their
operations in or with the Sanctioned Countries is only a beginning. It
is also important to review the quality of information that is then dis-
closed. A review of the actual disclosure revealed that counting 70
companies as "disclosing" likely overestimates the amount of informa-
tion available to investors. Of the 70 companies that provided any
disclosure mentioning the Sanctioned Countries, 19 provided only
meaningless disclosure (for example, listing a subsidiary with the word
376. Of these, 35 were ADR facilities without significant periodic disclosure by the non-U.S.
company.
377. This figure represents the 18 companies that only disclosed, plus the 52 companies that
both disclosed and engaged in correspondence with the SEC.
378. In what may be a simple way to avoid having the name of a Sanctioned Country in its
searchable disclosure, Sinopec referred to its purchase of oil from Iran and Sudan by referring to
oil sourced from suppliers in "countries or regions that are on the sanction list published and
administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury."
China Petroleum & Chem. Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 3 (May 20, 2009), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data1123658/0001341004090010311china-20f.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2010).
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"Iran" in its name). 379 Only 51 of the companies actually provided
disclosure with information about activities in or with a Sanctioned
Country that might be useful to an investor. Even the meaningful dis-
closure varied widely: 18 companies explicitly stated that the com-
pany's activities in the Sanctioned Country were not material; 40
companies made a reference to U.S. sanctions; 21 companies noted a
risk from divestment or reputational harm; and 7 companies conceded
that the imposition of sanctions could have a material adverse effect
on the company.380
Even overlooking the quality variations in disclosure, however, the
results are striking. Of the Pool of 142 companies with business activi-
ties in or with the Sanctioned Countries, only 51 (36%) meaningfully
disclosed those activities.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this "post-September 11th"/"War in Iraq"/"War in Afghanistan"/
"Genocide in Sudan"/"Iran with Nuclear Ambitions" world, the
United States uses economic sanctions to counter global threats and
to try to increase global security. As discussed in Part II, sanctions are
a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Sanctions are not without
problems. In particular, political and legal limitations on the ability of
the United States to impose its laws extraterritorially provide an op-
portunity for regulatory arbitrage: multinational businesses will con-
duct operations under the varying laws of different jurisdictions. As a
practical matter, the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations and for-
eign corporations doing business in the United States may conduct
operations in SSTs or otherwise do business in contravention of U.S.
foreign policy and even security interests.
Securities law, through its central mechanism of disclosure, can be
used to address this problem. As discussed in Part III, shareholders
expect to know what their companies do, and investors generally ex-
pect to know how their capital is being used. In particular, as dis-
cussed in Part IV, U.S. investors expect to know whether a company
379. It is not clear what to do with the meaningless disclosure cases, and whether they should
be considered disclosure at all. However, because the companies did use the word "Iran," "Su-
dan," or "Cuba" in their disclosure documents, thereby making them retrievable through an
EDGAR search, those disclosures were counted.
380. Some companies avoided the term "material" and noted instead the potential for "ad-
verse effects" from investor reticence or the imposition of sanctions. See Total S.A., Annual
Report (Form 20-F), at 6-7 (Apr. 3, 2009). Others stated that they could not say that the imposi-
tion of sanctions would not have a material adverse effect. See Sasol Ltd., Annual Report (Form
20-F), at 26-28 (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/314590/000 1 04 7 4 6 9 0 8 0 10 7
39/a2187995z20-f.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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in which they are investing-a company to which they are providing
money in return for a share of the profits-is conducting operations in
opposition to their nation's foreign policy. Of course, due to the pos-
sibilities of regulatory arbitrage in a globalized world, in some cases
an investor may decide to invest in a company doing business in an
SST anyway. But to keep the investor ignorant of her complicity, al-
beit indirect, with the regimes of countries such as Iran, Sudan, and
Cuba, runs counter to the spirit of the U.S. securities laws.
Precisely because interest in such operations is widespread and in-
tense (and resistance to disclosure is high), information about these
operations is "material" in the traditional securities law sense, as laid
out by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and Basic. For example,
institutional investors, NGOs, and much of the international commu-
nity have expressed concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions, and hor-
ror at the violent treatment of protesters in the wake of the June 2009
elections. More generally, as demonstrated by the history of the issue
discussed in Part IV, there is a "substantial likelihood" that a "reason-
able person" would consider information about operations in or with
countries sanctioned by the United States as SSTs "important."' 381
If information about a company's operations in or with the Sanc-
tioned Countries is important to investors, then the U.S. federal secur-
ities laws should be enforced by requiring companies to disclose it.382
Yet the research described in Part V shows that the majority of com-
panies are not providing any disclosure. Although the SEC, using the
OGSR, seems to be attempting to elicit disclosure, such efforts have
not been effective. Information about activities in and with the Sanc-
tioned Countries is being disclosed at a low rate. To add insult to
injury, five years after the establishment of the OGSR and two years
since the Web Tool, it is still nearly impossible for investors to find the
information they need from publicly available sources, including the
SEC. In short, very little information is effectively disclosed.
In the absence of clear guidance from the SEC, it appears that the
materiality standard is not taken seriously by ostensibly "reporting"
companies and their counsel.383 Specifically, a putatively small finan-
381. See supra Part II.C.
382. Bear in mind, as mentioned above, that not all material information must be disclosed
under the securities laws.
383. This is especially troubling given the recent discovery of Bernard Madoff's fraudulent
investment scheme, the recent collapse of stock prices, and the financial crisis.
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cial impact of many of the operations in question is treated as simply
dispositive. 3s4
As a matter of accounting, after Enron and the accounting scandals,
and after AIG and the financial crisis, claims that a line of business is
unimportant and need not be disclosed, at least not in any detail,
ought to serve as a warning flag. A line of business that is indeed de
minimis might need to be discontinued, not operated in hiding. As a
matter of securities law, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court nor
the SEC has ever defined materiality in terms of some financial
threshold or said that matters of lesser monetary consequence need
not be disclosed. The standard has always been what a reasonable
investor would likely want to know.
Some issues are accepted by the SEC and investors to be material
regardless of their monetary amount. For example, if a company hires
a CEO who was convicted of a small amount of embezzlement, the
law requires the company to disclose that. As demonstrated in Part
IV, interest in business in SSTs is high. The general economic reasons
for such interest are obvious. Operations in countries sanctioned as
SSTs confront more risks by definition. 38 5 Activities in the Sanctioned
Countries may have a significant financial impact on a company once
such activities are made public because of the general repugnance for
many of the regimes in question. In fact, a negative public reaction is
no doubt a large part of why companies are so hesitant to disclose and
why they expend real money fighting the Web Tool, resisting OGSR
suggestions about disclosure, commenting on the Concept Release,
and so forth. Company reputation and share value are at risk because
investors find this issue significant. The potential quantitative impact
of divestment, boycotts, and public shaming may be high.
It should also be remembered, however, that more than money is at
issue here. It is likely that a U.S. investor would want to know if the
company in which his retirement savings are invested is helping Iran's
nuclear program or electoral repression, or buying transportation for
Janjaweed raids in Sudan, or facilitating attacks on U.S. troops in Af-
384. This is in spite of the SEC's clear statement in the 1999 SAB that a quantitative analysis
cannot be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant considerations. See SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999).
385. A number of state investment retirement boards continue to take the position that com-
panies with business operations in SSTs are exposed to a special risk category. See, e.g., Protect-
ing Georgia's Investments Act, 2008 Ga. Laws 1022 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 47-20-83.1)
(requiring public defined benefit retirement plans in Georgia to determine if they have in their




ghanistan. U.S. investors are also often taxpayers and citizens who
have profound interests in not supporting threats to U.S. security.
So what is to be done? Simply enough, the SEC could make clear
what Chairman Unger strongly implied years ago: information about
business activities in and with SSTs-enemies of the United States-is
something that reasonable U.S. investors want to know. This has been
empirically demonstrated in this Article. Such activities are therefore
material under traditional legal standards. No new law or regulation
is necessary. All that is required is for the SEC to enforce a reasona-
ble, indeed traditional, understanding of "materiality."
Alternatively, reporting companies could be required to disclose
whether they, or any of their affiliates, conduct operations in or with
SSTs through stricter application of Regulation S-K. The materiality
standard is not at issue.386 Regulation S-K Item 101(d)(3) requires
disclosure of risks attendant to foreign operations.38 7 In addition,
Regulation S-K requires foreign private issuers to disclose whether
investors may bring actions against it under civil liberty provisions.
Any of those sections would be a reasonable place to require compa-
nies to disclose the existence of any direct or indirect operations in or
with countries that are subject to U.S. sanctions as SSTs.
Finally, Regulation S-K could simply be amended to include an ex-
plicit requirement that business in or with SSTs by a company or its
affiliates be disclosed as a matter of course. This would not be an
onerous requirement-there are simply not that many countries that
the United States designates as SSTs. 388
As the United States increases the complexity of its sanction re-
gimes, and as companies consolidate and sell securities across borders,
issues like this are bound to arise. While some bankers and politicians
have objected to the use of the capital markets as a tool for foreign
policy, in a globalized world, financial policy simply cannot be isolated
from foreign policy concerns, including security concerns. 389 Financial
386. Regulation S-K Item 101 already requires a company to provide a description of its busi-
ness, its principal products, availability of raw materials, seasonality, and backlog orders. See,
e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c )(1)(i)-(viii) (2009). Note, however, that this information is required
to be disclosed "[t]o the extent material to an understanding of the registrant's business taken as
a whole." Id. § 229.101(c)(1).
387. See id. § 229.101(d)(3).
388. As of January 1, 2010, the United States has designated four countries as SSTs: Cuba,
Iran, Sudan, and Syria.
389. In testimony to the Senate Banking Committee shortly after the release of the Unger
Letter, Alan Greenspan rejected the idea of linking political agendas and disclosure. See The
Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy Report for 2000: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 13 (2000) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). On the other hand, proponents argue
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and foreign policies have always been intertwined. From the negotia-
tions to fund the U.S. War of Independence, to the Marshall Plan, to
contemporary worries about U.S.-China debt relations, financial pol-
icy is responsive to foreign policy, and vice versa.
It is time for securities lawyers on both sides of this issue to ac-
knowledge that the emperor has no clothes. Companies object to dis-
closing information about their operations in or with SSTs because
they fear that disclosure would alarm investors who do not want to
invest in a company that does business in such a country. And that is
precisely why, as a matter of securities law, plain and simple, such
disclosure must be made.
that market-oriented reforms requiring more disclosure of operations in SSTs and global secur-
ity risk could be "the most potent non-military means available to the U.S. to curtail terror-
sponsorship and WMD development and proliferation." See Foreign Policy Hearing, supra note
3, at 6 (statement of Roger Robinson, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Conflict Secur-
ities Advisory Group). Robinson goes on to argue,
The U.S. financial system remains a dominant force on the global landscape that few
responsible foreign financial institutions and companies can live without. Regrettably,
requiring these hard choices on the part of primarily foreign companies and banks is
now a necessity. Postponing this day of final reckoning will make more likely a nuclear
Iran and more capable and dangerous U.S. adversaries worldwide.
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